Clemson University

TigerPrints
All Theses

Theses

8-2010

GÌäRARD DE LACAZE-DUTHIERS,
CHARLES PÌäGUY, AND EDWARD
CARPENTER: AN EXAMINATION OF NEOROMANTIC RADICALISM BEFORE THE
GREAT WAR
Joseph Peterson
Clemson University, jwpeter@clemson.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_theses
Part of the European History Commons
Recommended Citation
Peterson, Joseph, "GÌäRARD DE LACAZE-DUTHIERS, CHARLES PÌäGUY, AND EDWARD CARPENTER: AN
EXAMINATION OF NEO-ROMANTIC RADICALISM BEFORE THE GREAT WAR" (2010). All Theses. 871.
https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_theses/871

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses at TigerPrints. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Theses by an authorized
administrator of TigerPrints. For more information, please contact kokeefe@clemson.edu.

GÉRARD DE LACAZE-DUTHIERS, CHARLES PÉGUY, AND EDWARD
CARPENTER: AN EXAMINATION OF NEO-ROMANTIC RADICALISM
BEFORE THE GREAT WAR

A Thesis
Presented to
the Graduate School of
Clemson University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
History

by
Joseph W. Peterson
August 2010

Accepted by:
Dr. Alan Grubb, Committee Chair
Dr. Steven G. Marks
Dr. Stephanie L. Barczewski

ABSTRACT

The fin-de-siècle in Europe was a time in which, perhaps more than any other,
thinkers framed social questions in religious, mystical, and particularly Christian, forms. The
persistence, in the late 19th century, of Romantic narratives of sin and salvation coincided
with the growth of organized social movements, with the result that many socialist thinkers
saw the movement of history as one of redemption from some primal loss of unity. The
three social thinkers which comprise this examination—Gérard de Lacaze-Duthiers, Charles
Péguy, and Edward Carpenter—demonstrated an ambiguity between religious antecedents
and engagement with contemporary problems, very like the more self-conscious fusions of
tradition and change perpetrated by the artists and poets of the Modernist moment. All three
shared a neo-Romantic preoccupation with man‟s conflicted nature—the presence of sin,
suffering, and opposition to good which coexists with heroic integrity in the world—and all
tried to resolve the problem using heterodox Christian modes of thought and argument,
although their hoped-for paradises were temporal, secular, and socialist. Exploring their
social projects and respective levels of success will clarify, on the one hand, how fanatical
conservatism often takes the guise of avant-garde progressivism, but, conversely, how even
the unconscious application of traditional, orthodox religious concepts can in some cases
empower progressive, humanist social goals.
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INTRODUCTION
In his 1974 article, evocatively entitled “Can the Devil Be Saved?,” intellectual
historian Leszek Kolakowski uses the title‟s theme as a symbol of a larger, “fundamental
question,” “neither a specifically Christian nor even a specifically religious” question: “Can
the cosmic and historical drama be interpreted as a movement towards the ultimate
reconciliation of all things? Will the evils of the human condition, our sufferings and our
failures, reveal their redemptive meaning when seen from the vantage point of ultimate
salvation?”1 Within this very general formulation, Kolakowski shows the preoccupation that
both religious and secular theodicies, such as Marxism, have in common. To put the
question even more generally: is optimism concerning the possibility of future unity and
understanding justified, or is it right to be pessimistic? Kolakowski believes that social
thinkers are right to retain some notion of “original sin,” that is, that humanity‟s attempts to
solve all social and economic problems are likely to be dangerous and bring with them new
kinds of suffering and inequality. At the same time, he counters, although skepticism is the
correct position with regard to grand solutions, human societies need people who are
confident in the power of progress—otherwise, “original sin” becomes an excuse for
maintaining the status quo.2
The fin-de-siècle in Europe was a time in which, perhaps more than any other,
thinkers framed social questions, like Kolakowski, in religious, and particularly Christian,
forms. The persistence, in the late 19th century, of Romantic narratives of sin and salvation
coincided with the growth of organized social movements, with the result that many socialist
1
2

Leszek Kolakowski, Modernity on Endless Trial, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), 75.
Ibid., 85.
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thinkers saw the movement of history as one of redemption from some primal loss of unity.
Jacques Barzun, in his classic treatment of Romanticism, goes to great lengths to defend
Romanticism against the host of commonplace, and frequently negative, descriptors:
“Romanticism is not a return to the Middle Ages, a love of the exotic, a revolt from Reason,
an exaggeration of individualism, a liberation of the unconscious, a reaction against scientific
method, a revival of pantheism, idealism, and Catholicism, a rejection of artistic conventions,
a preference for emotion, a movement back to nature, or a glorification of force.”3 Certainly,
many Romantics displayed one or more of these traits, but, according to Barzun, they are
best defined by their common attempts to construct a new world and philosophy after the
destruction of the Napoleonic Wars and the implosion of Enlightenment confidence, and by
their shared presuppositions about the dual nature of man—capable of both “greatness” and
“wretchedness.”4 Many Romantic thinkers rediscovered, with approval, Pascal‟s image of
man as a “thinking reed,” at once higher and lower than the animals.5
The period comprising the last 30 years before the Great War—various overlapping
sections of which are described as the fin-de-siècle, the Belle Époque, or the neo-Romantic or
Modernist moment, depending on one‟s perspective—was marked by even more rapid and
cataclysmic change (and by even fiercer reaction) than that of Romanticism‟s first
ascendancy a century earlier. Even as intellectuals, artists, and religionists were becoming
disillusioned with the dry dogmatisms of 19th-century bourgeois materialism, determinism,

Jacques Barzun, Classic, Romantic and Modern, (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1961), 13.
Ibid., 14-16.
5 Ibid., 17.
3
4
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and positivism, the tempo of industrialization and technological innovation increased.6
Industrialization and growing economic liberalization created large new wealthy classes, as
well as many newly impoverished. Numbers of workers and petty bourgeoisie, like the shopowning family of young Louis-Ferdinand Céline, found the struggle for financial security
almost unbearable.
With the unprecedented ease and frequency of international travel and
communication (partly due to imperial projects), this was also a time of greater ideological
and religious pluralism. In this connection, it is becoming evident that simplistic theses of
modern secularization and de-secularization are misleading, and that it was often pluralization
of religious thought that provoked negative reactions, even among those who claimed they
were combating “secularization.” Henri Massis—an adherent of Charles Maurras‟
reactionary, royalist Action Française movement, and Charles Péguy‟s primary interwar
hagiographer—bemoaned the fact that, in the Great War, “At the very moment when
technical progress seemed to be on the point of bringing about the unity of the human race,
there occurred the most complete rupture of equilibrium that the world had ever known.”7
He blamed the Great War on the influence of “Asiaticism” (Eastern mystical philosophies)
in Germany, and quoted Charles Maurras in support: “the human race is less united than it
was under Titus, when all the civilized peoples were grouped under the fasces” or “than it was
in the time of Saint Louis, when all the Christian peoples were confederated under the Triple

Steven G. Marks, How Russia Shaped the Modern World, (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2003), 177.
7 Henri Massis, Defence of the West, trans. F. S. Flint, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1928),
18.
6
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Crown.”8 Massis concludes, dolefully, “[T]he facility of material communications, which was,
according to democratic doctrines, to bring about a union of minds, has succeeded in
making the world uniform, but not in uniting it.”9
New, pre-Freudian emphases on the inscrutability and complexity of the human
psyche challenged bourgeois, mechanistic and rationalistic codes of morality. Referring to
Franz Kafka, but also to Kafka‟s contemporaries in general, Frederick Karl has observed
that there is a “preponderance of „mad‟ figures” in the Modernist literature of pre-Great War
Europe—characters who are “naïve and mad, innocent and lacking the ability to live in the
world.” He explains this preponderance as a reaction against the positivistic and pragmatic
“new religion” of logic and rationalism: in defense of their countercultural values, the avantgarde “tendered a particularly savage and bitter god, the madman, as arbiter of taste,
sensibility, and, often, ideology.”10 From André Gide‟s illegitimate scion of an aristocratic
line “Lafcadio,” whose gratuitous act of murder, a “crime without a motive,” is intended to
confound and satirize the moralistic systems of his upper-class relatives, to Robert Musil‟s
Christ-like simpleton and sex murderer “Moosbrugger,” whose apparent innocence and
inability to feel remorse for his brutal stabbing of a prostitute baffles the Viennese
mandarins in their professional rigidity: fictional representations of mentally unbalanced,
“un-civilized” outsiders became a commonplace of social criticism and rebellion in the early
20th century.

In Ibid., 18-19.
Ibid., 19.
10 Frederick Karl, Franz Kafka: Representative Man, (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1991), 132.
8
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Finally, the rise of the German nation, with its industrial, technological, and military
prowess and high birth rates,11 gave reason for apocalyptic anxieties about “decadence,”
particularly in France and Austria, whose respective defeats and humiliations at the hands of
the Prussians had provoked the creation of the French Third Republic and the AustroHungarian reconfiguration of the Austrian Empire. Many conservatives in France saw the
defeat as retribution, divine or natural, for the sins of Republicanism and secularization.
Ultra-Catholics, after the fact, interpreted the condemnatory words of the Marian apparition
at La Salette (which were more ominous and less popular than the message of the Lourdes
apparition) as a prediction of the debacle of 1871—the fall of Paris and the Commune.12 For
these cultural critics—exemplified by Léon Bloy, that “pilgrim of the absolute” whose quest
took him from the Chat Noir to a visceral, reactionary Catholicism—France‟s errors could
only be expiated and corrected by a return to monarchy and Catholicism.13 Of course, many
European thinkers, whether religious or secular, coped with the period‟s dynamism and
ideological uncertainties by turning to the absolute of nationalism.
In sum, as Péguy famously (and, I believe, correctly) observed in 1913, “[T]he world
has changed less since Jesus Christ than it has done in the last thirty years.”14 Musil
remembered 1913 similarly: “time was racing along like a cavalry camel…. But nobody knew
where time was headed. And it was not always clear what was up or down, what was going

Eugen Weber, France: Fin de Siècle, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press, 1986), 23.
Richard D. E. Burton, Holy Tears, Holy Blood: Women, Catholicism, and the Culture of Suffering in
France, 1840-1970, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), xiii.
13 See Ibid., 1-19.
14 In David Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985),
395.
11
12
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forward or backward.”15 Musil, with the benefit of hindsight and of his scientific training
under the great logical positivist Ernst Mach, was not as wary of the pace of modern
civilization as was Péguy. In fact, Musil playfully mocked reactionary neo-Romanticism as
“the well-known suffering caused by that familiar malady of contemporary man known as
civilization” and “the ineffable wave of anemic romanticism and yearning for God that, for a
while, the machine age squirted out as an expression of its spiritual and artistic misgivings
about itself.”16 Yet for all this, Musil‟s vast unfinished philosophical novel, The Man without
Qualities, is in many respects a characteristic indictment of scientistic overconfidence and,
more importantly, a deeply sensitive attempt to construct some new “experimental utopia”
following the collapse of liberal bourgeois values.17 Finally, speaking of the fin-de-siècle
mania for both sensual and spiritual diversions of all kinds, Paul Valéry is paraphrased by
Eugen Weber: “the very pace of modernity was like an intoxication: one had to increase the
dose or change poisons.”18 One need look no further than Oscar Wilde‟s The Picture of Dorian
Gray and Joris-Karl Huysmans‟ À rebours to discover the cultural prominence of dandified
aesthetes who experiment equally with philosophy, religion, literature, narcotics and love in
order to escape ennui and to experience the élan vital which eludes modern man.
As had their Romantic predecessors a century before, many neo-Romantic artists
and thinkers coped with the flux of modern life and organized their thoughts and
experiences by recourse to older presuppositions, patterns of thought, or forms of
expression—though their content was often radically progressive, and subversive of
Robert Musil, The Man without Qualities, Vol. I, trans. Sophie Wilkins and Burton Pike, (New York:
Vintage International, 1995), 7.
16 Ibid., 105, 106.
17 See Lowell A. Bangerter, “Experimental Utopias: The Man without Qualities,” in ed. Harold Bloom,
Robert Musil’s “The Man without Qualities,” (Philadelphia: Chelsea House Publishers, 2005), 5-19.
18 Weber, 32.
15
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traditional ideologies. In the arts, for example, Diaghilev‟s Ballet Russes was infused,
according to one of the movement‟s principal aestheticians, with the “liturgical quality” of
ballet, “something truly divine and mystic,” and aimed, in the words of Diaghilev himself, at
a totality, a wholeness “through which all the complexity of life, all feelings and passions,
could be expressed apart from words and ideas.”19 Similarly, the French composer Erik Satie
wrote avant-garde, minimalist music inspired by liturgy and Gregorian chant, by the sound
of the organ and the curve of the ogives at Notre Dame Cathedral, and by his readings in
Rosicrucian and Gnostic philosophies. Marcel Proust offered up a spiritual autobiography
whose sprawling narrative of lost innocence, instructive wanderings, and return to the
community-affirming vocation of literature has aptly been compared to Augustine‟s
Confessions.20 And T. S. Eliot, perhaps Modernism‟s most famous model of tradition-in-theservice of the avant-garde, self-consciously wrote that “the most individual parts of (a poet‟s)
work may be those in which the dead poets, his ancestors, assert their immortality most
vigorously.”21
The three figures which comprise this examination—Gérard de Lacaze-Duthiers,
Charles Péguy, and Edward Carpenter—were not primarily artists (though two of the three
were poets of varying but not inconsiderable talent and originality, and the other a Symbolist
critic of art and literature). Rather, it is in their social thought, a field to which all three
aspired, that I find the ambiguity between religious antecedents and engagement with
contemporary problems that so pervaded their neo-Romantic, Modernist epoch. All three

In Marks, 180, 181.
M.H. Abrams, Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature (New York:
W.W. Norton and Company, 1994), 83.
21 In S. Musgrove, T. S. Eliot and Walt Whitman, (New York: Haskell House Publishers, 1970), 9.
19
20

7

shared the preoccupation, which Barzun identified in Romanticism, with man‟s conflicted
nature—the presence of sin, suffering, and opposition to good which coexists with heroic
integrity in the world—and all tried to resolve the problem using heterodox Christian modes
of thought and argument, although their hoped-for paradises were temporal, secular, and
socialist. The ways in which fin-de-siècle social thinkers employed traditional Christian forms
and concepts were often less conscious, and, perhaps for that reason, less caricatured than
the more self-aware invocations of the artists. Exploring their various social projects and
levels of success will further clarify, on the one hand, how fanatical conservatism often takes
the guise of avant-garde progressivism—witness Céline, Stravinsky, Cocteau and many
others—but, on the other hand, how even the unconscious application of traditional,
orthodox religious concepts can sometimes empower progressive, humanist social goals.
Gérard de Lacaze-Duthiers is by far the least historically consequential of the three.
A prolific but minor art critic for the Symbolist review La Plume, Lacaze-Duthiers was a selfproclaimed anarchist who, with André Colomer, founded the “Artistocracy” movement. The
“Artistocrats,” like other extreme individualistic anarchists, lauded the criminal activities of
the Bonnot Gang, attempted to locate the roots of such “illegalist” actions in the writings of
Henri Bergson, and were something of an influence on later artistic avant-gardes such as the
cubists and the futurists. Lacaze-Duthiers was the primary theoretician of the movement,
and, interestingly, his social and aesthetic thought was originally intended to have strong
democratic implications. He hoped that, eventually, all people would obtain membership in
the commonwealth of “artists.” But Lacaze-Duthiers was too enamored of the artistic
prowess of the Romantic martyr—a figure necessarily opposed in his own life and vindicated
only posthumously—to be a true democratic, universalist thinker.
8

Charles Péguy, another French socialist with anarchist and oppositional inclinations,
was largely overlooked in his own lifetime, though he enjoyed widespread fame after his
death at the front in the first days of the Great War. His religious poem, The Portal of the
Virtue of Hope, has seen more than sixty editions in France. As he liked to remind his
intellectual friends later, Péguy grew up in relative poverty in Orléans, where his widowed
mother and grandmother worked as chair menders. Performing exceptionally well in his
early schooling, Péguy was admitted to the École Normale Supérieure where, like so many other
fin-de-siècle Normaliens, he fell under the influence of Lucien Herr and became a socialist. As
a student, he participated energetically in pro-Dreyfus rallies, and then spent most of his
brief adulthood editing and writing for his eccentrically socialist Cahiers de la Quinzaine. For
Péguy, the goals of Christian salvation and socialist salvation—how to admit all to heaven,
and all to the future earthly utopia—were explicitly intertwined. From an early age, Péguy
had reacted strongly against the Catholic doctrine of eternal punishment, and his socialist
writings are full of insistences that “the Harmonious City” will reject no one. Yet his later
writings, like those of Lacaze-Duthiers, increasingly emphasize the necessary and eternal
opposition that will meet the Romantic hero (in Péguy‟s case, the French nation).
Edward Carpenter, the English advocate of back-to-nature simplicity, Walt
Whitman, Hinduism, and homosexual encounters between social classes, also conceived of
the socialist millennium, and of humanity‟s progress towards it, in distinctly ChristianRomantic ways. Although Carpenter attributed much of his philosophic outlook to his
readings of Whitman, the Bhagavat Gita, and English transpositions of Marxist thought, in
fact his narrative of lost unity, of educative sufferings and self-knowledge, and of universal
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return to the One, owed a greater debt to the culture of liberal Anglicanism and
Romanticism in which he was brought up.
*

*

*

The process by which Carpenter, an Englishman, introduced himself into a study
originally intended to focus exclusively on French thinkers was gradual. As I read
Carpenter‟s long prose poem Towards Democracy, for another project, I was struck by the
incredible similarities in style and content to the religious poetry of Péguy. Both are early
adopters of free verse, like Whitman; both write about monistic fusions of physical and
spiritual values, again like Whitman; and both rely on explicit formulations of the Christian
doctrine of the incarnation, much more than does Whitman, to support and elaborate their
monism. Carpenter was famously and very consciously inspired by Leaves of Grass, whereas
no connection with Péguy has been conclusively proven—but Whitman was very popular in
Péguy‟s milieu and the similarities are great enough that some have been tempted to posit
conscious influence.22
Upon further examination, I found that there are many more instances of neoRomantic ambiguity in Carpenter‟s social thought than just his appropriation of the Christian
doctrine of the incarnation. I also realized that the English fin-de-siècle scene, in general, was
an almost necessary foil and complement to the French: thrust together politically and
diplomatically near the end of the Belle Époque, they had been cultural allies for much longer,
both seeing themselves, for better or worse, as the true inheritors of Roman and Western
civilization against the more conflicted, “Eastern” cultures of Germany and Russia, and

See P. M. Jones, “Whitman in France,” The Modern Language Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Jan., 1915), 127.
22
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against the imperfect image of the East formed by colonial encounters. Finally, Carpenter‟s
inclusion is perhaps a function of my own neo-Romantic need for teleology, for “cosmos in
chaos,” since, in my opinion, his thought is the most perfectly hybrid of the three—the most
productive synthesis of orthodoxy and revolution—and hence a fitting conclusion to the
essay.
In terms of the Christian-Romantic theodicies and salvation narratives that support
each of their socialist projects, I will argue, Lacaze-Duthiers and Péguy are both
“Manichean,” emphatic of the Romantic need for suffering, evil, and opposition, and hence
pessimistic about the possibility of universal reconciliation. Carpenter, on the other hand,
although his redemption narrative also commits the traditional Christian heresy of the felix
culpa, making sin necessary for the greater good it paradoxically activates, is more “neoPlatonist” than “Manichean.” For Carpenter, evil is not eternally necessary in order to define,
by opposition, the good. Carpenter is sincerely, and perhaps naively, optimistic in his belief
that all persons and all beliefs will eventually recognize their common origin and return to
unity. Even criminal activity should be seen as a sign of dissatisfaction with the present, and
as the harbinger of eventual reconciliation.23 Opposing beliefs should be investigated,
thought Carpenter, not to better offset the single, true belief, but to find the truth latent in
each one.
Though my examination focuses on the relationship between tradition and change in
the period before the Great War, let me suggest its relevance to the longtime debate
concerning the intersection between the Great War and the birth of modernism. Jay Winter

Edward Carpenter, Civilisation: Its Cause and Cure, (London: Swan, Sonnenschein and Co., 1908),
100-105.
23
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has famously argued, in opposition to Paul Fussell, that “the rupture of 1914-1918 was much
less complete than previous scholars have suggested,” and that “the history of modernism”
is “much more complicated than a simple, linear divide between „old‟ and „new‟ might
suggest.”24 Winter echoes Roger Shattuck‟s now-inescapable contention that modernism was
a pre-war phenomenon, and amplifies the argument for continuity by demonstrating the
traditional, religious ways in which Great War survivors mourned. Focusing on individual
and communal expressions of grief, Winter argues that the reversion to traditional forms of
remembrance and cultural representation was not necessarily a conscious rejection of
modernist ambiguities and uncertainties, but a result of private searches for meaning and
consolation after so much seemingly senseless tragedy. “The strength of what may be termed
„traditional‟ forms in social and cultural life, in art, poetry, and ritual,” writes Winter, “lay in
their power to mediate bereavement.”25
From the perspective of my research, the ways in which traditional, neo-Romantic
forms of thought and expression “mediated” the discomfort caused by the earlier, lesser
cataclysms of the fin-de-siècle certainly seems to indicate that these coping methods have a
persistent power. But not everything, after the war, remained the same. With only the most
cursory look at the ideologically-motivated violence that lay ahead, I would suggest that, to
the extent that Christian theodicies persisted in interwar thought, the “Manichean,”
oppositional strain of neo-Romantic social thought became more frantic, more menacing,
and predominated over the more optimistic, “neo-Platonist” one—not without reason, given
the suffering endured by so many.
Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 3.
25 Ibid., 5.
24
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CRITICISM, COMMUNICATION, AND “THE CRISIS OF THE LIBERAL EGO”:
THE ANARCHIST AESTHETICS OF GÉRARD DE LACAZE-DUTHIERS
It is customary to preface treatments of anarchism with an acknowledgement of the
term‟s almost prohibitive plurality of applications.26 Due to its doctrinal fluidity and inherent
hatred of authority and rigidity, “anarchism”—in its fin-de-siècle heyday—was invoked by
earnest revolutionaries, bohemian dandies, back-to-nature Romantics, egoists, down-andouters, and shallow “bourgeois youth” who, in the condemnatory words of Peter Kropotkin,
only sought “liberation from the concept of good and evil.”27 This miscellany of adherents is
usually grouped into “two strands”28: those who espoused the Kropotkin-inspired majority
position of communitarian harmony, and the heterodox individualists, concerned only with
self-affirmation in the present. Jesse Cohn writes that anarchism‟s individualist tendencies
are “marginal,” and, serving as the inspiration for terrorism and “propaganda by the deed,”
those tendencies “[bear] little relation to the socialist mainstream of anarchism,”29 while
Alexander Varias speaks of “a great gap” separating communitarian and individualist
anarchists.30
These binary definitions certainly help to categorize diverse brands of anarchism, but
the relationship between individualistic and communistic anarchism is complex, and cannot

See, for example, Alexander Varias, Paris and the Anarchists: Aesthetes and Subversives During the
Fin de Siècle, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 1-8; Richard Sonn, Anarchism and Cultural Politics
in Fin de Siècle France, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), 12; and Noam Chomsky,
“Introduction,” in Daniel Guérin, Anarchism: From Theory to Practice, trans. by Mary Klopper, (New
York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), vii.
27 Quoted in John G. Hutton, Neo-Impressionism and the Search for Solid Ground: Art, Science, and
Anarchism in Fin-de-Siècle France, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 1994), 53.
28 Hutton, 53-54.
29 Jesse Cohn, Anarchism and the Crisis of Representation: Hermeneutics, Aesthetics, Politics,
(Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 2006), 15.
30 Varias, 4.
26
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always be charted between these poles. Richard Sonn has implied, for instance, that the
terrorist martyrs of the 1890‟s (sometimes thought of as the last blundering manifestations
of anarcho-individualism before the strategic shift to syndicalism31) were not consistent
individualists at all, in that they sacrificed their lives for an abstraction, an ideal-future vision
of collective humanity.32And Daniel Guérin, perhaps more than any other historian of
anarchism, has downplayed the differences between the two strains, emphasizing the
individualistic elements in Bakunin and Kropotkin‟s philosophies, while pointing to the
egoist Max Stirner‟s (occasional) acknowledgements of man‟s social needs. “When one looks
more deeply into the manner,” Guérin writes, “the partisans of total freedom and those of
social organization do not appear as far apart.”33
In the aesthetic realm, which famously subsumed politics for many fin-de-siècle
artists and anarchists,34 the individual-collective dichotomy corresponds to conflicts such as
Symbolism vs. Art Social, Idealism vs. Realism, esoteric formal innovations vs. intelligible
content, and the general problem of the function of the avant-garde. In the 1890s, many
Symbolist poets called themselves anarchists, feeling that their crusade against conventions
such as rhyme and meter was comparable to the individualist anarchists‟ quest for total
freedom.35 The Symbolists, following Baudelaire‟s studied dandyism, and informed by
Barrès‟ Culte du Moi and Stirner‟s egoism, preferred obscure and solipsistic dream states over
attempts to communicate with others, and rejected the possibility that common people could
Jean Maitron, Histoire du Mouvement Anarchiste en France (1880-1914), (Paris: Societe
Universitaire d’Editions et de Libraire, 1951), 241.
32 Sonn, 264-266, 289.
33 Daniel Guérin, Anarchism: From Theory to Practice, trans. by Mary Klopper, (New York: Monthly
Review Press, 1970), 4.
34 See Sonn, ch. 8, “Literary Anarchism: The Aestheticization of Politics,” pp. 211-236; also Cohn, 133.
35 Ali Nematollahy, “Anarchism and Literature in France, 1870-1900,” (Ph.D. Diss., City University of
New York, 2001), 81-88. See also Varias, 136.
31
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either understand or produce true art. The aesthetic theories of Proudhon, Bakunin, and
Kropotkin, by contrast, emphasized the need to wrest the production (and appreciation) of
art from the elite, and called for an art that was accessible, realistic, and social.36
This latter dichotomy has a larger context. As much as mainstream Marxists may at
times have wanted to believe it, these contradictions are not restricted to the anarchist brand
of socialism. The analogous question of the role of “declassed” bourgeois theoreticians in
the spontaneous, inevitable movement of the mass—“word” vs. “deed”—is a stone on
which numerous permutations of Marxism have stumbled. A. James Gregor, speaking of
Lenin‟s emphasis on the need for a theoretically pure, revolutionary elite, observes that “in
all of this one cannot help but see the features of the hero in history—the role of the
committed, moral, sacrificial leader of masses, without whom, all the inevitabilities of history
come to nought. Whatever the pretended rationale, Sorel‟s warrior elite makes its appearance
and shapes the course of history.”37 To quote Guérin once again, “Relations between the
masses and the conscious minority constitute a problem to which no full solution has been
found by the Marxists or even by the anarchists, and one on which it seems that the last
word has not yet been said.”38
Perhaps no anarchist thinker sustained an uneasy equilibrium of individualism and
collectivism, self and society more systematically than the art critic Gérard de LacazeDuthiers—both in his aesthetics and, by explicit extension, in his politics. Lacaze-Duthiers
began his career as an art critic for the Symbolist review La Plume, and was later the primary
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theoretical force behind the “Artistocracy” movement, which began in 1906 with the
publication of his L’Ideal Humain de l’Art. Artistocracy, with its organ L’Action d’Art edited by
André Colomer, was, along with Libertad‟s “illegalist” L’Anarchie and Sebastian Faure‟s Le
Libertaire, one of the few self-asserting departures from the general trend in anarchism
towards organization, and it influenced modernist avant-gardes such as Cubism, Futurism,
and post-war Surrealism.39 Lacaze-Duthiers‟ thought borrowed heavily from Oscar Wilde,
Nietzsche, and Max Stirner, and, as time progressed, became increasingly dominated by the
Stirner-ean component.40 But the foundational documents of Lacaze-Duthiers‟ system—
especially L’Ideal Humain de l’Art and La Decouverte de la Vie (1907)—are marked, despite their
implied elitism and individualism, by an optimistic belief in the complementarity of the
person and the common good, and in the potential of all people to share in this harmony.
Lacaze-Duthiers later remarked that he had, in fact, first intended Artistocracy as “a
form of democratic renewal.”41 Further, Florian-Parmentier, a Symbolist poet and critic
whose works appeared in the Action d’Art bookstore,42 also remarked on the egalitarian
impulse of Lacaze-Duthiers‟ early manifestoes. Even though the Artistocrat, according to
Florian-Parmentier in his comprehensive account of fin-de-siècle literary movements, must
live “„in beauty,‟ outside of laws, religions, morality and politics,” and though he “recognizes
no other authority than his conscience,” nevertheless, “he differs from the Nietzschean
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„over-man‟ in that he refuses to take part in an „elite.”‟ The ranks of the Artistocracy,
concludes Florian-Parmentier, are theoretically open to all, from the wealthiest noblemen to
the dregs of society: “any man can be regenerated if he follows the law of the Beautiful, if he
realizes the beauty in his heart [italics mine].”43
Florian-Parmentier‟s conception of Nietzsche‟s Übermensch as necessarily antidemocratic, and his portrayal of the relationship between Nietzsche and Lacaze-Duthiers as
antagonistic are, we shall see, misleading and simplistic. Still, he rightly notes LacazeDuthiers‟ early emphasis on universal, classless potential. Florian-Parmentier, being a
Symbolist himself, actually condemns these egalitarian aspirations, and praises the movement
for its recent departure from them. To want to communicate one‟s faith, he writes, “is the
eternal error of the deluded and sincere.”44 Fortunately, most of the Artistocrats have learned
that the masses do not have the vision necessary to become original, self-creating individuals.
They now know that “only artists are visionaries.”45
Doubly marginal—as an individualist after the shift to syndicalism, yet as a closet
communitarian among individualists—Lacaze-Duthiers was well placed to attempt a
philosophical reconciliation. And though his democratic tendencies were rather
inconsequential historically (it was his more elitist, vanguardist pronouncements that would
influence the Cubists and Futurists), the project is valuable, on the level of purest theoretical
concerns, both for its unique clarifications of the more prominent thinkers with whom he
engaged, and also for its semi-coherent resolution of a perennial socialist contradiction.
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But Lacaze-Duthiers‟ venture is more than a contribution “from nowhere” to a
narrow anarcho-socialist debate. It is, from a broader cultural perspective, significant as one
symptom among many (but an especially characteristic one) of the Belle Époque‟s obsession
with merging subject and object, artist and art, self and society, intuition and intellect, action
and reflection—all oppositions that had allegedly been created by the materialism of the
bourgeois, liberal order. From the “liberation” from positivism famously afforded by
Bergson,46 and his use of the category of intuition to call for an “open society” based on love
and sympathy, to Proust‟s long, sorrowful, but eventually successful quest to escape “the
tedium of being confined in one‟s skin”47—the intellectuals of the avant-guerre were
possessed of a neo-Romantic confidence that man was not alone in the world, that intuitive
communication with others (and, accordingly, with an artwork) was possible.
Finally, as we shall see, Lacaze-Duthiers‟ reconciliatory attempt has a current and
nearly universal relevance—in that it clarifies the potential dangers of wanting to construct
oneself as a daring, spurned visionary, while simultaneously claiming to represent the needs
and desires of the many. The convictions that “I am right because I am alone,” and yet that
“I am right because I am in the majority,” are, of course, ultimately incompatible, and radical
thinkers who employ this dialectic often escape the contradiction only by privileging the
former argument over the latter. Lacaze-Duthiers would seem ultimately to follow this
trajectory, favoring self over society, the individual over the collective, without renouncing
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his views on the absolute, universal nature of political and aesthetic goods. In so doing, he
undercut the ethical potential of anarchism‟s alleged pluralism, and provided one of the
theoretical models for fascism, terrorism and other Romantic individualisms that impose
their truth claims on others.
*

*

*

In Lacaze-Duthiers‟ first manifesto, L’Ideal Humain de L’Art, he spends the bulk of
the text defining “art,” not introducing his neologism “Artistocracy” until page 72 of 97. His
style is not slavishly systematic, but rather aphoristic—full of repetition yet with gradual
amplifications of meaning. Some of what he writes would seem at first to fit snugly into the
framework of the aesthetes and individualist anarchists of the 1890s, of whom John G.
Hutton writes that they “drew upon often ill digested snippets of Friedrich Nietzsche and
Max Stirner…to invoke a world of pitiless struggle in which all had the potential for freedom
but only few superior individuals had the courage to seize it.”48 Lacaze-Duthiers held that
“art” includes much more than works of literature or painting; art is, most importantly, action:
a life lived originally, self-consciously, and deliberately without regard for convention.49
He professed the almost common view, by his time, that “ethics is only the
realization of aesthetics.” Those who do not live this way, those who are not with the
practitioners of an aesthetic lifestyle, are necessarily against them, and this includes “the
majority of men.”50 To be truly “human” is to be artistic; therefore, the mediocrities (those
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who go about their lives unthinkingly observing bourgeois “mœurs”) are not even human.51
We ought to worship beauty, he continues, and we find this beauty by observing our own
deliberate deeds; and, because self-conscious, life-affirming deeds are beautiful, they are
necessarily moral.52 “No law contradicts the development of the person,” he writes, and the
one who has developed his life into an artwork has the right to venerate his own life as
divine. Only mediocrities separate life from art, self from god. True artistic man is the
creator of his own feelings, even of his own soul.53 “The genius” makes his own rules; he is
in possession of himself and knows what he wants.54 Further, the creator should be “without
pity for mediocrities.”55
Compare all this to Laurent Tailhade‟s famous praise of Vaillant‟s terrorist attack on
the Chamber of Deputies—it mattered not whether a few “vagues humanités” were killed,
so long as it was a beautiful and individualistic deed.56 One is reminded, even, of the
thoroughgoing egoism of Zo d‟Axa, who wrote that “in sum, I am sure of nothing save that
one must live for Oneself: to live in joy, to live in battle, to give oneself to the present so
completely that the future no longer matters.”57 Unlike d‟Axa, though, Lacaze-Duthiers
believed that the artistic minority should be conscious of others and of the future of the
collective. Still, when this concern appears in the text, one could argue that it is undercut by
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elitism and paternalism. He writes, “This elite exerts a happy influence. It directs the rest of
humanity.”58
Further, he seems to imply that, even under the direction of the elite, not many
mediocrities will be saved. Art will struggle against ugliness and use it, in order to
demonstrate the aesthetic and ethical superiority of its “ploutocratie.” With an increasing
religiosity, Lacaze-Duthiers prophesies that, in the end, “Each reaps according to his works:
the ones, derision, the others, admiration.”59 Despite efforts to avoid it, he skirts dangerously
close to an aesthetic Manichaeism that makes the existence of ugliness and fallen men
necessary in order to distinguish the beautiful, glorified few. He even implies that the subhuman mediocrities are somehow incapable of truly living, and are hence predestined to their
damnation: “des médiocres,” he defines at one point, as those who “have never lived and will
never live [italics mine].”60 Small wonder that the Futurist Gino Severini, who associated with
the Action d’Art project early on and saw them as his philosophical allies, remembered that
what we are dealing with here is a special anarchism; it was a movement, in any case,
which placed the social dimension behind the aesthetic in problems concerning
humanity….[T]hey used to say there were no classes in society, there were only those
who were for or against beauty. In the first category belonged men of free spirits…in
the second group were spirits made for enslavement….In opposition to democratic
ideas of equality [the Action d’Art group] left these aphorisms of the „I‟ integral: „All
men are not equal.‟ „There do not exist two identical human beings‟….At this time
our young friends…knew of Nietzsche…from whom they did not deny their
paternity….„Long live violence against everything which renders life ugly‟ was their
battle cry.61
But all this is to emphasize only one aspect of Lacaze-Duthiers‟ fluid system. His
elitism is mitigated, his individualism partially reconciled with collectivism by his inclusive
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ideas of what constitutes art, and by his then-revolutionary notion of “criticism” as audience
participation in the creative process. Lacaze-Duthiers explicitly rejects the solipsism of the
Symbolists, asserting that art that is “anti-social,” “made for a small number,” or that “is not
popular” is false and narrow.62 “Art is social,” he writes; “it is not indifferent.”63 What good
are masterpieces, he provocatively asks, without men “to understand them, to love them?”64
Yet he does not embrace the “social art” movement, either. As did Kropotkin, in fact, he
believes that art should be neither basely propagandistic, nor despairingly realistic, nor
uselessly subjective—it should contain both the real and ideal, because that is truest reality.65
Art‟s purpose is not to set the ideal against the real, but rather to “discover, in the real, the
ideal.”66 He repudiates the effete, subjectivist dreaming of Symbolism even more explicitly in
his next work, La Découverte de la Vie: “Today…we should not write for an elite. We no
longer take refuge in mystery. The dream is dead….Our obligation is to be, more than
ever…precise in our assertions [italics mine].”67
Unlike other individualist anarchists, such as Remy de Gourmont, Laurent Tailhade,
and Zo d‟Axa, moreover, he does not think that the only valuable, realizable goal is
individual, internal harmony. On the contrary, harmony with others, and with nature, is a
necessary prerequisite to harmony with oneself.68 In fact, “Art” is synonymous with “love,”
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and stands for “the solidarity by which man knows himself in harmony with everything that
exists.”69
Lacaze-Duthiers‟ belief that life itself is every person‟s primary artwork also has
obvious democratic applications. Art is not “the privilege of an elite.” Because every act can
be a work of art, as long as it is done deliberately and self-consciously, “All men should be
artists.”70 This is why Lacaze-Duthiers can proclaim that “the artist and the worker, the
peasant, the miner, are creators,” whose various jobs actually serve the same exact purpose:
the glorification of man and his artistic faculties. This individualist, then, has found a way to
answer Bakunin‟s call for the destruction of the boundary between manual and intellectual
labor. Bakunin wrote, in his Revolutionary Catechism, that “the artificial separation between
manual and intellectual labor must give way to a new social synthesis. When the man of
science performs manual labor and the man of work performs intellectual labor, free
intelligent work will become the glory of mankind, the source of its dignity and rights.”71 For
Lacaze-Duthiers, manual laborers are capable of intellectual work at the same level as that of
the artists proper. In order to become artists, it is only necessary that they act, not
mechanically, but purposefully—with a “sincere and living” effort. This kind of “egoism,”
incidentally, is endorsed by Bakunin‟s more communal conception of anarchism. In God and
the State, the great revolutionary writes that “the liberty of man consists solely in this: that he
obeys natural laws because he has himself recognized them as such, and not because they have
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been externally imposed upon him by any extrinsic will whatever.”72 In other words, for
Bakunin as for Lacaze-Duthiers, the truly free man (the artist), may at times find it as
expedient to observe prevailing rules as to reject them, but he must above all live
intentionally.
The most crucial component of Lacaze-Duthiers‟ egalitarian collectivism is his
concept of “criticism.” By admiring, questioning, or simply attempting to understand a work
of art—by “criticizing”—according to Lacaze-Duthiers, the viewer participates in the
production of art. Audience criticism is itself a distinct artwork, elevating the viewer to a
more deliberate, self-conscious lifestyle. In a turn of phrase that he will repeat again and
again throughout his early manifestoes, he asserts that “to admire is to create a second time [italics
mine]…. It is to collaborate in the work of the creator.”73 The Artistocracy—even though it
includes actual, technical makers of art, alongside those who only admire and critique that
art—is, in fact, a democracy, because “anyone who admires a work is an artist.” LacazeDuthiers insists that the two should be seen as equals in the relationship, and seems to want
to preclude the charge that there could be even an implicit, patronizing division between
artist and audience—“There is no intermediary between the author and the mob: they
sympathize.”74
Criticism resolves the tension between Symbolist subjectivism and the grounded
objectivism of the more socially conscious anarchists. Lacaze-Duthiers seems to believe that
each artist-critic creates, with criticism, a modified, unique work of art in his own mind, but
at the same time communicates with the artist‟s original intent and approaches a common
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ideal. A work of art (whether in life, thought, or on canvas) is only true if it is absolutely
original, the product of one‟s own voice; and yet, each artist will find that they illustrate a
single, life-affirming ideal. “We toil separately,” writes Lacaze-Duthiers, “convinced that we
toil in a common work.”75 In terms of the aesthetic debates of the time, he responds with a
neo-Kantian confidence that truth can be at once subjective and universal.
More importantly, though, in the realm of politics, criticism is the key to resolving
tactical differences between individual and collective anarchisms. In that it does not call for
concerted effort to effect societal change, but only calls on individuals to live artistically in
the present, Lacaze-Duthiers‟ criticism would appear to be completely egoistic and tactically
bankrupt. On the other hand, it demands that all individuals live beautifully, not just a
chosen few; and they are not to live only for themselves, but as exemplars so that others—
both now and in the future—may, by admiring and interacting with their beauty, become
beautiful themselves. “Social progress consists in the comprehension of art,” LacazeDuthiers concludes: “To critique”—to admire, understand, and love an art piece, and to
recreate a separate work of art in oneself—“is to realize progress.”76
Lacaze-Duthiers‟ already-cited second manifesto, La Découverte de la Vie, is largely a
repetition, at much greater length, of the ideas of L’Ideal Humain de l’Art. He does make
some amplifications, however, especially on the idea of criticism as art. He is continually
tempted to bask in the Romantic heroism of the artist proper, yet at the same time, he works
even harder to dissolve the implicit difference between artist-creator and artist-admirer. An
artist is anyone who thinks, hopes, adores—anyone who collaborates in the harmony of life,
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loves it and understands it, anyone who works and suffers.77 He continues, “[The critic]
understands the work of the novelist and of the poet only by being himself poet and
novelist, artist in the presence of life…. [T]here is no difference between art and criticism.”78
Finally, as if he has not yet made himself clear, he proclaims, “We ignore that there are
producers and critics. We do not understand what this distinction signifies.”79
He could hardly have disagreed more with his Action d’Art compatriot Manuel
Devaldes, who wrote that “art in its manifestations should essentially be egoist; the artist
should work for his own pleasure and not that of the audience…the artist should be a sort
of god, with a pure soul, capable of creating beautiful works which are useful by their beauty
and without the intellectual help of any layman.”80 Devaldes denied any possibility that the
needs and goals of the artistic elite and the public could merge. But for Lacaze-Duthiers the
two were not at odds. The audience (collective) is made up entirely of potential artists
(individuals) and the former is best served when it cultivates the development of the latter.
With confidence in this symbiotic relationship, he could declare, “We work for them [future,
abstract humanity] by working for ourselves [italics mine].”81 Theoretically, then, LacazeDuthiers‟ brand of individualist anarchism is not an egoist rejection of organization for the
future; rather, future good is best achieved by individual, artistic living in the present.
Oscar Wilde‟s social and artistic theories, themselves partially inspired by readings of
Kropotkin, William Morris, and John Ruskin, were an important influence on LacazeDuthiers, and, consequently, their philosophies share a number of similarities. In fact, when
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Wilde‟s tomb, designed by Jacob Epstein and installed in Père Lachaise cemetery, was
censured by the Prefect of Police and an official committee of aesthetics for the allegedly
obscene genitals of its sculpted angel, the Artistocrats launched a crusade in defense of the
tomb. In the name of Artistocratic and Wildean tenets, the Action d’Art journal published
articles comparing the tomb favorably to other sanctioned works, circulated a petition
against state censorship, and ran a series of excerpts from Wilde‟s primary political essay,
“The Soul of Man under Socialism.”82 Yet, for all his reliance on Wilde, Lacaze-Duthiers
makes some significant alterations to Wilde‟s thought, particularly with his notion of
criticism.
Wilde, like Lacaze-Duthiers, believed that the true artist-individual would not “admit
any laws but its own laws; nor any authority but its own authority.”83 His individual, too,
prizes singularity above all else, and is simply “himself.” Again, like Lacaze-Duthiers, Wilde
reconciles the needs of the collective with his individualism by merely pointing to the
positive example to others that the true, life-loving individual can be. The great man must
isolate himself in order to “realise the perfection of what was in him, to his own incomparable
gain, and to the incomparable and lasting gain of the whole world.”84 Later, Wilde writes that
the true personality of man “will not meddle with others,” but will nevertheless “help all, as a
beautiful thing helps us by being what it is.”85 A Wildean artist, like an Artistocrat, best
serves the needs of the public by disregarding them.
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Most importantly for my present purpose, Wilde also believed that common people
had the ability to be enlightened by art. But in order to learn, they must first be freed from
the necessity of having to work for their sustenance. Only the rentier, having the time to
cultivate himself, can be a true artist. Herein is the “chief advantage” of socialism, for Wilde:
by redistributing wealth equally, it would remove any necessity of living and working for
others, and enable all to be authentic individuals.86 All this is reminiscent of the Marxist
distinction between the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom (with a heterodox,
individualistic spin, of course), and, as opposed to the anarchism of Proudhon, Kropotkin,
and Bakunin, implies a disdain for manual labor. Wilde is happy to elaborate on this disdain,
claiming that people who work are tainted by the “tyranny of want.” They have “no grace of
manner, or charm of speech, or civilisation, or culture, or refinement in pleasures, or joy of
life” and are “absolutely of no importance.”87 In complete opposition to Lacaze-Duthiers‟
belief in the artistic possibilities of physical work, Wilde writes, “There is nothing necessarily
dignified about manual labour at all, and most of it is absolutely degrading.”88
But liberation from the daily necessities of work and provision is only part of the
common man‟s road to full humanity. He must, as in Lacaze-Duthiers‟ system, learn by
example from a vital, distinctive work of art. In order to do so, though, he must submit,
relinquish his right to criticize—even allow the work to “dominate” him. Wilde finds that
the public, while capable of being cultivated, lacks a sufficient “temperament of receptivity.”
What they do not understand is that
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the work of art is to dominate the spectator: the spectator is not to dominate the work
of art. The spectator is to be receptive. He is to be the violin on which the master is
to play. And the more completely he can suppress his own silly views, his own
foolish prejudices, his own absurd ideas of what Art should be, or should not be, the
more likely he is to understand and appreciate the work of art in question…. He is not
the arbiter of the work of art [italics mine].89
It is hard to imagine a view of audience participation more opposed to Lacaze-Duthiers‟, for
whom, as for Nietzsche in his final, post-Wagner phase,90 criticism is itself a separate work of
art, lifting the viewer up to a more deliberate, innovative lifestyle. Criticism, then, for LacazeDuthiers, is a concept crucial to his synthesis of individualism and collectivism. The people
are not simply guided by an egoistic yet unaccountably benevolent avant-garde; they can
themselves interact equally with an artwork, thereby creating a unique work of art and taking
their place in the ranks of the simultaneously elite and democratic Artistocracy.
Still, one might argue that Wilde‟s aesthetic anarchism is more practical, more
tactically effective than Lacaze-Duthiers‟. He does, after all, at least address the need for the
appropriation and redistribution of wealth. Lacaze-Duthiers‟ entire revolution, by contrast,
takes place only inside individuals, without concern for their physical needs. However, by
stipulating that mediocrities will only become artists when they have emancipated themselves
from material cares, while insisting at the same time that those who are already enlightened
must not neglect their role as beautiful exemplars by descending into altruistic and socialistic
projects, Wilde has rendered the status quo inevitable and eternal. Lacaze-Duthiers‟
expectations, on the other hand, are perhaps more utopian, more optimistic, yet oddly more
realizable. Each person is, at the present moment, a latent artist, and must only live his life
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more thoughtfully, justly, and lovingly to bring all others into the Artistocracy. This is why
Lacaze-Duthiers can declare that, however elitist an individual artist may be, “art…has its
source in the aspirations of the mass.”91
*

*

*

The Belle Époque, writes Zeev Sternhell, was a “period of gestation, the period that
saw the elaboration of the new syntheses of the twentieth century.”92 Sternhell is primarily
concerned with the Fascist synthesis, but his statement holds true across numerous fields of
thought and action. The youth of the avant-guerre, according to an old but well-attested
narrative, having been alienated by the abstract and materialistic individualism of their
fathers, sought a rapprochement between spiritual and material patterns of thought, between
tradition and innovation, reason and unreason, self and society. “Members of the pre-1914
generation” looked for these syntheses, according to R. C. Grogin, “in a renewal of religious
belief, in nationalistic fervor, in new elites, in a new heroic stance, in a revolutionary
mythology, in new artistic trends, and in a mystical intuitionism.”93 In his famous thesis on
Belle Époque “modernism,” Roger Shattuck characterizes Apollinaire‟s “Simultanism,” like
Proust‟s memory, as an attempt to become both observer and observed, involved and
indifferent, and thereby to sympathize better with the whole.94 In this connection, Shattuck
cites Baudelaire (for his influence on Apollinaire): pure, modern art must “create a suggestive
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magic which contains both subject and object, the external world and the artist himself.”95
Among the “deepest yearnings of the early years of this century,” according to Shattuck, was
the desire both to create art and to be art, simultaneously to affirm oneself and to lose oneself
in communion with all.
For Bergson, too, mystical intuition has strong social, communicative implications,
and he makes this explicit in his Two Sources of Morality and Religion. The way to acquire a love
that is not “tribal,” a love that does not necessarily exclude and hate some, is through a
religious-mystical inspiration that sees and sympathizes with the humanity in all. The open
soul, member of an open society, is able to achieve “a spiritual union, a more or less
complete identification” with others in the group—not by abstract morality alone, but
through mystical intuition, imagining oneself into the place of another.96 To reiterate, then,
unlike their mechanistic, individualistic bourgeois predecessors, the intellectuals and artists of
Belle Époque modernism optimistically affirmed, among other things, man‟s ability to
communicate spiritually with other persons and external objects.
Lacaze-Duthiers‟ democratic conception of audience criticism, itself a symptom of
the synthesizing climate of opinion in which he lived, ought to have enabled him to affirm
unequivocally the possibility of artistic communication, to combat what I have called the
aesthetic Manichaeism of his system. The tension between universal potential on the one
hand, and the need for a majority of ugly and uncomprehending mediocrities in order to
distinguish the Romantic-heretical avant-garde on the other, runs through his entire system.
He insists that “in the coming humanity the meaning of art will not escape anyone…. [T]he
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division of humanity into two groups: artists and mediocrities, will no longer exist.”97
Elsewhere, too, he claims that the artists “are today what all men will be tomorrow.”98
Conversely, though, Lacaze-Duthiers often emphasizes the leadership by the
enlightened ones, and at times hints at the necessary failure of that leadership. The heroic
individual is the only one who can, by sacrificing himself, “bring joy to all men.”99 Moreover,
and more ominously, he has the “duty to direct…the unthinking souls” and to “eliminate the
mediocre souls.”100 Lacaze-Duthiers believes, at least sometimes, that art is not possible
without the harmonious contrast of beauty and ugliness: “If it represented only the beauties
of life, without describing the counterfeiting of it, art would lack harmony, would not
exist.”101 His Manichaeism is so persistent that he even turns to scholastic theodicy
(“artodicy”?) to correct his tendency towards believing in the necessity of ugliness, evil, and
suffering. He claims that ugliness and mediocrity, as with evil in Aquinas‟ system, do not
strictly exist—they are, in fact, best described as “nothingness.”102
In the end, Lacaze-Duthiers‟ democratic project is overwhelmed by his elitism. The
prominence he gives to the distinction between the artistic few and the mediocre many
undermines his concept of audience criticism and objective interaction. He yields to the idea
that the eternal existence of non-artists is profitable in that it demonstrates, negatively, the
greatness of being an artist,103 much as, in the Jansenist tradition, the damned serve the
necessary purpose of forever demonstrating the justice and glory of God. In the last pages of
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his second manifesto, Lacaze-Duthiers admits that the universalism of audience criticism is
an ideal that will never be achieved; therefore, happily, the individualistic, Artistocratic class
will always be needed. He abandons the social project entirely: “Let us accept the present,
such as it is…. Let us think that…if ugliness did not exist, we would cease to be happy,” he
writes. All being perfect, we would no longer have vital opportunities “to struggle or to
hope.”104 The artist must be a heretic—it is necessary, of course, that he be misunderstood,
“a posthumous man.” This latent, elitist Romanticism completely enervates the universalism
of Lacaze-Duthiers‟ system. “In the beginning was the deed,” he would later quote Goethe
in Sebastian Fauré‟s Encycopédie Anarchiste of 1934, rejecting his earlier idealism explicitly.105 In
another entry in the Encyclopédie, he elaborated that “aesthetic action” could be “useful,
useless, humane, inhumane. Every sincere act is an artistic act.”106 Gone is the emphasis on
the ethical reflection of “criticism,” and in its place a prizing of action for action‟s sake.
Like Lacaze-Duthiers, Gustav Klimt, according to Carl Schorske‟s celebrated
account, initially opposed the “crisis of the liberal ego” with a belief in the public,
communicative function and universally redemptive power of revolutionary art. Self and
society, for Klimt the Secessionist, could be reconciled and united. Klimt “had set out to
regenerate Austria by creating a whole Kunstvolk,” but in the end, disillusioned by the
rejections of public and official patronage alike, he withdrew into a more Wildean, solipsistic
individualism. “The social circle,” Schorske concludes, “had narrowed in the mind of the
Klimt group to the artist-decorator and his customers.” For Klimt and his coterie, as for
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Lacaze-Duthiers, “an aesthetically schooled elite became their world.”107 Klimt lived out his
days executing private portraits for the upper classes.
Interestingly enough, years before his own and Klimt‟s similar apostasies, LacazeDuthiers had written an early pair of art criticism pieces charting developments in
contemporary Austrian painting, in which he correctly perceived and lauded the democratic,
communicative impulse of the Secessionists. He praised the Austrian milieu in general,
because “socialism and individualism are making common cause,”108 and the Secessionists in
particular for rejecting stale academe and the official competitions of the over-packed salons.
Instead, they displayed their works simply and not too closely together—without regard for
medals and accolades—so that viewers could see the true “value” that a painting has “only in
itself.”109 In his second report, Lacaze-Duthiers continued that each Secessionist, though
associated in a group, “keeps his individuality, his temperament.”110 Klimt, especially, he
recognizes for “the suppleness of his art,” and he finds all the Secessionists to be adept
reconcilers of nature, life, and dream.111 They had shown, Lacaze-Duthiers believed, that
revolutionary youth can make a difference, and it only remained to render their art more
explicitly social: “Art ought to play a more intense role in the social question…. The mission
of young Austrian painters…is to cause the new spirit to triumph, to proclaim the rights of
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the ideal against the material, the rights of justice against force, the rights of the individual
against the egoism of society.”112
Yet for all this synthesizing social concern, one can already discern in LacazeDuthiers‟ thought the seeds of the elitism and aesthetic class-consciousness that would
undermine his egalitarianism. The fact that the Secessionists have met with opposition, he
claims, is in itself sufficient evidence of their value as a movement.113 As in his later
formulations, then, the disapproval of the uncomprehending masses is an essential and
eternal aspect of the Romantic hero‟s narrative. In his valorization of “youth” as against
tradition, and in his strong opposition of the practitioners of the new morality to those of
the old, too, he prefigures his rejection of intuitive sympathy and communication between
different persons.
This departure from faith in the intellectual-artistic abilities of the masses, with its
concomitant failure to merge self and society, was a disillusionment endured not just by
Klimt and Lacaze-Duthiers. Lenin‟s emphasis on carefully guarded, revolutionary orthodoxy
on the one hand, and Sorel‟s repudiation of doctrine in favor of mobilizing, vitalist myth on
the other, seem to be driven by a similar disdain for the proletarian intellect. LacazeDuthiers, likewise, by failing to sustain the tension between elite and commoner, subject and
object—by abandoning the Belle Époque‟s optimism concerning the possibilities of
existential communication—placed his thought squarely in the well-traveled path of protofascism, terrorism, and other absolutist systems relying on the compulsion of others. Like so
many other avant-guerre modernists, he had called for an aestheticization of ethics, politics,
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and life. In Shattuck‟s felicitous phrase, “The frame had been overrun, and art set itself up as
continuous with life.”114 The only measure of a deed‟s morality was its beauty.
Still, joined to the liberal-pluralistic notion of “criticism” as sympathetic, intuitive,
objective participation for all, Lacaze-Duthiers‟ “aestheticization of politics” could have
avoided a base, immoral elitism. But with criticism undermined by his Romantic emphasis
on the chosen few, all that remained was either the fascist violation of the masses by some
“misunderstood” hero, or the loneliness of existentialism. The political inheritance of the
neo-Romantic moment was not all bad. The subjectivist, vitalist, irrationalist spirit of these
years was tempered by an intuitive, egalitarian merging of self and society. But LacazeDuthiers, like Sorel, perhaps feeling that the Bergsonian political interpretation of
“intuition”—as universal, mystic love and communion—was overly utopian, left it aside
while retaining the potentially negative elements. Without the deliberate identification with
others afforded by “criticism,” Lacaze-Duthiers‟ system is susceptible to all the classic,
democratic condemnations of the Romantic-aesthetic hero: “If self-realisation is aimed at as
the ultimate goal,” writes Isaiah Berlin, “then might it not be that the transformation of the
world by violence and skill is itself a kind of sublime, aesthetic act? Men either possess
creative genius, or they do not; those who do not must regard it as their proper destiny,
indeed as a high privilege, to be moulded—and broken—by those who do.”115 It was left to
Lacaze-Duthiers‟ disciples and allies to bear this conclusion out: the Futurist Filippo
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Marinetti, for his part, would later justify Italy‟s war with Ethiopia on the grounds that “war
is beautiful.”116
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“TWO HANDS JOINED”: BODY, SPIRIT, AND THE NATIONALISM OF
CHARLES PÉGUY
In late June of 1940, on the very day that Marshal Petain declared that the French
government was seeking an armistice, protester Edmond Michelet handed out pamphlets
containing aphorisms from the writings of Charles Péguy. Péguy, who had died in the first
days of the Great War, was a poet and a highly ambiguous, contested figure throughout the
interwar years. The tracts which Michelet, a Christian Democrat, distributed read: “In
wartime he who does not surrender is my man, whoever he is….And he who surrenders is
my enemy whoever he is.”117 Charles de Gaulle, too, was influenced by the thought of
Péguy—one of the general‟s favorite books was Péguy‟s popular religious poem Le Porche du
mystère de la deuxième vertu (The Portal of the Mystery of Hope).
At the same time, both Vichy collaborators and Parisian fascists (who faulted Vichy
for not going far enough) also attempted to appropriate Péguy‟s legacy. As a war-martyr who
had embraced socialism, Dreyfusism, nationalism, and a kind of anti-clerical Catholicism,
Péguy had such an ambivalent record that even his own sons differed with regard to the
interpretation of his thought. Pierre Péguy saw in him the harbinger of Vichy‟s conservative
but communal “National Revolution,” while Marcel went even farther, not without reason
writing that “my father is above all a racist.”118
Contemporary commentators and historians alike have long tried to locate the unity
binding Péguy‟s diverse pronouncements together. Emmanuel Mounier, the mid-century
Catholic existentialist, emphasized Péguy‟s continuing independence and oppositional spirit,
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writing that, despite the best efforts of extremists on both sides, “Péguy is a man who
cannot be annexed.”119 Raïssa Maritain, wife of the theologian and friend of Péguy Jacques
Maritain, also claimed for Péguy a timeless “desire for truth, justice, inner liberty,” a
complete inability to understand “doctrinaires.”120 Hans Schmitt, on the other hand, argued
that Péguy‟s life does not represent independence and ethical consistency, but rather a long,
“moral decline” into proto-Fascism.121 Schmitt writes: “In a short life he moved from one
extreme to another, and yet he claimed never to have changed.”122 Increasingly detached
from reality, his mind “depressed and brutalized” by the solitude and emptiness of his
literary crusades, Péguy allowed his socialism to “[re-emerge] as the national-socialism of
Barrès and Sorel.”123 “From 1910 to 1914,” Schmitt continues, “Péguy strode inexorably
toward an inferno of arbitrary violence and capricious disorder.”124 Zeev Sternhell, too, sees
Péguy‟s career as an evolution into a precursor of National Socialism.125 According to
Sternhell, Péguy‟s post-Dreyfus disillusionment with reformist socialism made him ripe, like
Mussolini, for a “discovery of the nation;”126 it was this change that explains his later
“venomous attacks on Jaurès, the living symbol of the democratic republic.”127 Still, despite
the differences between the continuity and change models (and both find much to
recommend them among Péguy‟s sprawling Cahiers), the most perceptive commentators on
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both sides recognize the lifelong importance, for Péguy, of a single, abiding concern: the
problem of eternal hell—or, in the interrogative form, how can universal redemption be
achieved?128
His uneasiness about the doctrine of hell was the main cause behind his adolescent
departure from the Catholic faith.129 “Nothing,” writes Schmitt, terrified Péguy more “than
the Christian vision of hell.”130 And Halévy characterizes Péguy‟s loss of faith as his refusal
“to believe in eternal evil.”131 Péguy is, therefore, careful to insist in his youthful utopia, The
Harmonious City, that the city will exclude no one—“As long as there is a single man outside,
the door slammed in his face encloses a city of injustice and hatred.”132 And in his most
socialist phase, when he famously left the École Normale to complete his first dramatic
treatment of Joan of Arc‟s life, his obsession became his heroine‟s: “Who is to be saved?”
Joan asks her spiritual mentor, Madame Gervaise, “How are they to be saved?”133 Joan even
volunteers to be damned if it would save some others from that fate, but Madame Gervaise
reprimands Joan for thinking Christ‟s sacrifice insufficient, for thinking her love could be
greater than his. Joan submits to Madame Gervaise‟s orthodoxy for a time, but rebels again.
“Forgive me, my God, if I blaspheme,” cries Joan, “when I think of [the notion that souls
are damned] I can no longer pray.”134 (Joan eventually leaves this problem unresolved, and
returns to temporal concerns at the thought of France‟s wartime sufferings.) Small wonder,
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as multiple critics have observed, that two of Péguy‟s key literary influences at this time were
Sophocles‟ Antigone, about a young woman who defies the king‟s law in order to fulfill her
own vision of justice, and Alfred de Vigny‟s Romantic poem Eloa, in which an angel
descends to hell in order to try to redeem Satan. 135
Vigny‟s vision is more pessimistic than Péguy‟s: Satan is able to seduce and secure
the damnation of Eloa. This pessimism pervades Vigny‟s views of the political and natural
worlds, as well. Optimistic about the powers of the lone intellectual (Saint-Beuve first coined
the term “ivory tower” in reference to Vigny, albeit somewhat unjustly), Vigny was skeptical
of the pretensions of mass man and of democratic politics. Both in his novels and in his
poetry, he glorifies the superior, intellectual savior who must certainly find incomprehension
and failure in his own life—if he is successful at all, it will be only posthumously.136
Revolution is pointless, because “The social order is bad and always will be.”137 Vigny
concludes, “Hope is the greatest of our follies.”138 Péguy, correspondent to his unyielding
hope concerning the eternal lot of humanity, never gave in to this kind of resigned despair
about universal, social transformation—despite his own neo-Romantic propensity for ivory
tower elitism.139
Péguy‟s ire at the idea of damnation did not dim with age; if anything, it increased. In
one of his early Cahiers, written while he was bedridden with the flu, and presumably
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recounting a dialogue with his doctor, Péguy erupted in an “explosion of violence,”
according to Halévy.140 His remarks are worth quoting at length:
I shall attack the Christian faith. What seems to us so strange, let me say outright, so
barbarous, the thing to which we can never assent, and which has haunted the best
Christians, the reason why the best Christians have gone away, or turned silently
aside, master, is this: that strange combination of life and death which we term
damnation, that strange reinforcement of a presence by an absence which eternity
makes entire. No man whose lot is cast with humanity can give his assent to this….
We don‟t admit a state of affairs where men are refused access to any city…. We
don‟t admit that there should be a single exception, nor that anybody should be
forcibly shut out…. An eternity of living death is a perverse, inverted conception.141
Finally, even when Péguy returned “to the threshold” of religious faith, under the
influence of Bergson, Jacques and Raïssa Maritain, and others, he refused to believe that it
was necessary to proselytize his wife and children. What is most distinctive about Péguy‟s
repudiation of the doctrine of hell, and with it, Catholic dogma, is his merging of spiritual
and temporal salvation. For Péguy, material concerns and spiritual concerns coexisted,
neither predominating. The possibility that all could be saved eternally meant that they should
also be redeemed temporally. Conversely, the fact that social-political universalism is a selfevident norm indicates that spiritual universalism must be also (evidence the quote above). In
this blending of matter and spirit, and the social and the religious goals, Péguy seems to be in
some respects merely a product of the Bergsonian, neo-Romantic climate of opinion, part of
the same movement that prompted Leo XIII to prescribe a more socially engaged
Catholicism.142 In other ways, though, Péguy‟s monism is an original, itself a precursor of
Catholicism‟s rapprochement with social and aesthetic progress.
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France‟s “religious renascence,”143 one manifestation of the rebellion against 19th
century materialism and determinism, developed simultaneously with the Third Republic,
emerging in the decade just after the Franco-Prussian War under the influence of such
literary luminaries as Léon Bloy and Joris-Karl Huysmans, gaining strength from the battle
against secular education, and securing its last prominent convert, the philosopher Gabriel
Marcel, on the eve of World War II. The movement is often seen as comprising two distinct
generations. The first generation, according to its still-definitive treatment, was a
“reactionary revolution” 144: an anti-intellectual and almost inevitable backlash against the
excessive confidence of Positivism and revolutionary ideologies. The reactionaries were
ultra-conservative, ultramontanist, apocalyptic, yet encouraging heterodox spiritualisms of all
kinds. Conversely, historians have generally recognized that the Catholics of the second
generation, following the Great War—many of whom frequented Jacques Maritain‟s “salon”
at Meudon—though more doctrinally orthodox than their predecessors, embraced social
progress and cultural and aesthetic innovations more eagerly.145 Maritain and his
contemporaries attempted to substitute the spirit of Thomism for the dead letter, and found
in it a justification for progressivism.
Péguy is commonly classed with the reactionary first generation of Catholic
renovators. Even though he did not officially return to the Church until 1908, almost two
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years after Maritain‟s conversion, and long after Leo XIII‟s Rerum Novarum, his nationalism,
polemical fervor, calculated anti-intellectualism, and admiration for provincial virtues and the
spirit of “the people,” seem to leave him at best an opponent of modernity, and at worst a
pseudo-traditional precursor of Fascism.146 Despite the accusations that Péguy was largely a
reactionary anti-modern, however, his thought actually carried within it unmistakably the
seeds of the Catholic modernism of the interwar years.
Stephen Schloesser has recently used the label “mystic modernism” to describe the
cultural alliance of religious and secular that followed the wartime political rapprochement of
the Union Sacrée.147 Schloesser argues that, rejecting the dualist theologies of their prewar
counterparts, postwar Catholic intellectuals returned to a more orthodox understanding of
the synthetic relationship between matter and spirit, time and eternity, culture and faith.
Péguy is certainly a pioneer of this “mystic modernism,” if sometimes an unwitting one.
Despite his traditionalist peasant persona, the sophisticated theological system contained in
his poetry is striking for its insistence on the value of temporal, material, and cultural
progress. Péguy, for whom the body and soul are like “two hands joined in prayer”—
eternally inseparable and equal in worth148 —anticipates the postwar Catholic rejection of
dualism, and paves the way for a reunion of grace and nature. Péguy is a “monist” to the
extent that, like Walt Whitman, his spirituality was an extremely material one. Although
Whitman‟s “monism” is energized by sexual hedonism, while Péguy‟s has overtones of
medieval asceticism, both affirm the conviction that things done in the body have intense,
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religious significance.149 Péguy‟s monism and his universalism are two aspects of his
character, then, that remained constant through a variety of applications.
Péguy‟s late and uncharacteristically popular poem The Portal of the Mystery of Hope
contains in microcosm all the particulars of his philosophy, logical growths whose seeds
were evident at the start of his career. The poem continues the convention of a dialogue
between Joan of Arc and her spiritual mentor, Madame Gervaise, although Gervaise is the
only one who speaks in The Portal. “Hope,” according to Péguy, is like a little child, and
alone, among the three Christian virtues, has the power to surprise God—to teach
something new, in a manner of speaking. Here is the “mystery” of which the title speaks.
Faith and Love are both “obvious”; one would have to “do violence” to oneself, “distort”
oneself, in order not to believe in God or not to love one‟s neighbor. But hope is
unexpected.150 Faith and love deal with what is—only hope “sees what will be.”151
To elaborate his point, Péguy moves into an exposition of the three parables
recorded in the Gospel of Luke chapter 15: “The Lost Coin,” “The Lost Sheep,” and, easily
the most famous, “The Prodigal Son.” Péguy emphasizes the goodness of God over his
greatness, at the expense of the more Jansenist strain in French Catholicism. Grounded in a
careful reading of this passage, Péguy‟s final understanding of the Christian God is of a
Father who is not content to damn the fallen object of his affection, but who even
experiences suffering and fear (another mystery) at the possibility that he will not regain his
lost son. God knew about faith and love, but, paradoxically, only fallen man could teach an
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all-knowing God how to hope. Péguy is solving the problem of evil here, by recourse to a
kind of felix culpa, rendering God less responsible because he has voluntarily made himself
impotent out of love, yet still able to turn evil into good. “Because of this lost sheep,” Péguy
writes, “Jesus experienced fear in love. / And the kind of tremor that divine hope creates in
love itself. / And God had been afraid he‟d have had to condemn it.”152 Hope emphasizes
the worth of man and the physical world, hope is something man can teach God about what
it means to be human, an intermediary between grace and nature, as was the angel Eloa. God
learns “human anxiety,” “mortal anxiety” from man [italics mine].153 Hope does more than
reconcile; she merges the two categories into one: “She…is the nearest to God / Because
she is the nearest to men.”154 And later, “being carnal she is pure. / But, being pure, she is
also carnal.”155
At this point, Péguy makes his rejection of a pessimistic dualism more explicit and
more ardent. Men—even saved, resurrected men—are not like angels, he insists, because
angels are not able to comprehend “this mysterious bond, this created bond, / Infinitely
mysterious, / Between the soul and the body.”156 The body, like the soul, will receive
salvation, and together they “will share the eternal, communal happiness”; finally, and
perhaps most importantly in terms of the social and religious implications of his monistic
optimism, he concludes, “[O]ne is no less just than the other.”157 After all, all men have “the very
body of Jesus.”158 God depends on man to give his eternal words a temporal, carnal life, to
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make sure “that the spirit lacks nothing of the flesh.”159 Another mystery: “A weak creature
carries God.”160 Péguy goes so far as to argue that we should hope in God because he first had
hope and confidence in us.161 The ultimate, slightly unorthodox, upshot: “God needs us,
God needs his creature.”162
These considerations about the basic goodness and potential of the physical world
lead Péguy to a conclusion directly opposed to Vigny‟s. For Péguy, the greatest folly is not
hope—it is, rather, despair. Despair is the “greatest sin that has ever been seen on earth.”163
He follows this judgment by linking despair to pride, using an identical phrase—“the greatest
sin that has ever been seen on earth”—to define pride.164 With this interesting and
perceptive equation, Péguy put his finger on what Jacques Maritain would later, in a clever
reversal, call the “Pelagianism of despair”165—the shallow brand of self-effacement and
misanthropy that manifests itself in self-confidence, the conviction that others are lost but
that the heroic individual has the ability to repent and individually succeed. These lines of The
Portal seem to be a dual indictment of the pessimistic strain of Romanticism and of
Augustinian-Lutheran strains of Christianity, and of the otherworldly desperation common
to them both. As late as in Péguy‟s career as 1913 (yet still early enough to predate more
mainstream debates about a socially engaged Catholicism), in an article published in his
Cahiers entitled L’argent (suite), Péguy reiterated the social implications of his monism: “I will
have none of a Christian charity which would mean the constant capitulation (of the
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spiritual) before temporal powers…. Unfortunately, it is not enough to be a Catholic. One
must still work in the temporal if one wishes to tear the future from temporal tyrannies [italics mine].”166
Thus Péguy‟s humanism is still intact, at least in principle, long after his
disillusionment with Dreyfusism and politics, after his alleged “descent to violence,”167 and
after his return to Catholicism. Nevertheless, The Portal also demonstrates those aspects of
Péguy‟s thought that have earned him less savory characterizations, the ways in which his
humanism had always been shot through with an exclusivist, nationalist strain. By the very
logic of his felix culpa, in order to glorify hope, he also glorifies the seeds of hope—suffering,
anxiety, doubt, and fear. Therefore, according to Péguy, in a kind of Nietzschean reversal of
values, those that are especially adept at suffering and at hoping are superior to those that are
not. God has given the French more tribulations than other nations because he knows they
can withstand them—“I was right to have confidence in this boy here,” says God, “He was a
Frenchman. / I was right to trust him.”168 Péguy then builds an extended metaphor likening
heaven-sent trials to heavy rains, and the French to skillful gardeners, more skillful, he
emphasizes, than any others. “Others would have made [the heavy rains] into marshes and
swamps full of fever and overpopulated with dirty, disgusting insects,” but not “My good,
healthy soil of Lorraine;” rather, “from this very water…they create the spring.”169 Again,
within this counterintuitive hierarchy, Péguy cannot refrain from national comparisons:
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“everywhere else,” the bad days “would poison entire countries…. But here, says God, in
this gentle France, my most noble creation… Here they are good gardeners.”170
In a passage similar in content to the neo-classicism of Maurras and the Action
Française, Péguy also seems to be using the metaphor of the garden to launch an attack on
what he perceives as distinctly German (and politically disruptive) ideologies, such as
Romanticism and Lutheranism. He rejects the Romantic fascination with wilderness and
sublime excess in nature, making God say that “nothing in my creation is as great / As the
beautiful gardens of well-ordered souls, like those of the French…. All the wild beauty of
the world is not worth one beautiful French garden.”171 Turning Romanticism on its head, he
goes on to claim that this orderly garden expresses more soul, more mystery, and more
sorrow than would a wilder, grander scene.172 “Savages will say that this garden is not great
and that it is not profound,” he writes, perhaps mocking the German-Romantic exaltation of
ancient forests and barbarian stock, “but I know, (says God), that nothing is as great as
order.”173 Here we see the reactionary Péguy coming through—in his nationalism, of course,
and his eagerness to attack an ideology native to Germany, but also in his disdain for
democracy and preference for classical structures in art and society. Here is the Péguy whose
invectives against Jaurès and the notion of democratic, reformist socialism were so
notorious.
Obviously, Péguy‟s inveterate nationalism led him into a number of paradoxes. With
reference to this specific argument about German culture, his denunciation of Romanticism
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is even more inconsistent than Charles Maurras‟, whose royalism and Catholicism were
pragmatic responses to French “decadence,” and whose neo-Classical critiques of
Romanticism were themselves the product of a Romantic nationalism—of the belief that
aesthetic style should reflect the essence of the nation.174 Maurras made much, therefore, of
preferring the French Classical tradition to more recent styles elevating emotion over reason.
Again, Péguy‟s exploitation of this kind of argument is even more ironic because his own
Romanticism was more prominent. He often idealized peasant life and the Middle Ages in
general, proudly invoking his own peasant stock.175 His nationalism has already been
observed, but, unlike Maurras, he also relied explicitly on the more liberal-Romantic
nationalism of Michelet. His selection of Joan of Arc for multiple treatments was certainly
informed by personal considerations, but was also a symptom of the widespread nationalist,
revanchist cult of Joan following the loss of Alsace-Lorraine.176 Finally, in the face of the
sometime Action Française adherent Jacques Maritain‟s censure of Bergsonian irrationalism
and intuitionism on rational and Thomist grounds, Péguy enthusiastically took Bergson‟s
part—arguing for the Christian application of Bergson‟s thought even after the latter‟s
consignment to the Index. Péguy was, after all, the epitome of that generation of
conservative critics of whom Fritz Stern writes, “[T]hey despised the discourse of
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intellectuals, depreciated reason, and exalted intuition…. [T]heir prose was fitfully lit up by
mystical, but apodictic epigrams.”177 For all these reasons, it is curious to see Péguy so
surrendering to his anti-German sentiment that he plays the role of the Maurrasian neoclassicist.
By Péguy‟s day, of course, French intellectuals had long participated in a
complicated, “love-hate” relationship with German culture, or at least with what they
perceived German culture to be.178 Initiated by Madame de Staël‟s citations of the German
virtues of intellectual freedom, individuality, idealism, simplicity and spontaneity in order to
criticize, by contrast, Napoleon‟s regime, French fascination with select representatives of
German thought and culture continued to grow up until the Franco-Prussian War. Despite
occasional evidence of Germany‟s increasing belligerence and industrial prowess, many
French Romantics preferred to retain de Staël‟s caricature of a nation of primitive
visionaries. Michelet thanked Germany for affording him the power to “study questions
deeply,” as well as for giving him “Kant, Beethoven, and a new faith.”179 Renan compared
his studies of German thought to “entering a temple; everything I have found there is pure,
elevated, moral, beautiful and touching.”180 According to Victor Hugo, “No nation is
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greater.”181 And Taine wrote, as late as 1867, “The Germans are the initiators and perhaps
the masters of the modern spirit.”182
Among intellectuals, reactions to the defeat in 1871 were mixed. Some, such as
Taine, argued that Germany‟s triumph was historically conditioned and justified by the
superiority of German culture—French classicism was no match for German relativism,
Protestantism and science.183 Many repudiated their love for German culture; and, where
Germany‟s martial actions contradicted earlier French assumptions, they accused Germany
of hypocrisy. One thing nearly all the post-1871 critics of German culture had in common,
including Péguy, was their indebtedness to German thought. Though Fustel de Coulanges
and Émile Durkheim both savagely denounced the Germans as barbarians, their own
philosophies had key German antecedents.184 Barrès looked to the ideas and works of
Wagner to bolster his Culte de Moi while simultaneously condemning the long practice of
teaching Kant to French pupils.185 And, of course, those who responded with an unthinking,
oppositional nationalism were imitating Germany‟s earlier, post-Napoleonic nationalist
movement, and the apparent success of her traditionalism.186
After the Great War, this kind of conflicted, generalizing cultural criticism only
continued. Henri Massis, an Action Française adherent and admirer of Péguy, published a
book in 1927 entitled Defense of the West, in which he charged German individualism and
irrationalism with the destruction of European unity—“spiritually undone since the
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Reformation” and “physically broken in 1914.”187 Germany, he says, parodying the neoclassicism of Maurras and Péguy, “is perpetually hesitating between Asiatic mysticism and
the Latin spirit, and…seems to be in a state of permanent protest against the Roman
idea.”188 Massis declares that “the sedition of the individual against the order of things…is an
essential characteristic of German individualism”; speaking of German thinkers such as
Spengler, Keyserling, Herder, and Robert Curtius, he claims that “to escape from the ancient
Roman discipline is the fixed idea of all these innovators.”189 For Massis, as for other French
pseudo-classicists of the pre- and post-war, the Germans are a new and ungrounded nation,
forever vulnerable to sudden change, and not acquainted with continuity, form or structure.
In concluding remarks that could, ironically, apply to the French just as easily in certain
contexts, Massis derides the Germans for “the ease with which they adapt themselves to new
forms of life, and receive contradictory impulses”—for “those historic upheavals which are a
continual threat to older and more complete nations, where culture is preserved and
transmitted as a long-tried practice.”190
Clearly, then, Péguy‟s conflicted intellectual relationship with Germany was a
commonplace in Belle Époque France. Even still, his internal contradictions were
uncommonly ironic, in that he employed the Maurrasian criticism of German Romanticism,
even when his own philosophy and aesthetic could hardly have been farther from French
neo-classicism.
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Beyond the specific inconsistencies in his cultural criticism, the most general and farranging paradox in these latter passages of The Portal is that he manages to turn his
universalistic optimism and concern for material progress into a criterion for excluding some
(those who are not universalistic and optimistic enough, presumably). In light of Péguy‟s
famous defense of Dreyfus and his long opposition to anti-Semitism, it is interesting that, in
his own more general project of exclusion and “othering,” he used the same kind of
paradoxical, oppositional logic so integral to religious and racial anti-Semitism. A
comparison of Péguy‟s exclusivism with both Léon Bloy‟s religious anti-Semitism, and with
the racial anti-Semitism of the Action Française and other neo-fascist groups, will bear this
out. Bloy, the often scatological and vitriolic Catholic polemicist whose dualistic Christianity
Péguy surpassed in so many ways, wrote his Le Salut par les Juifs in response to the “antiJewish lucubrations” of Edouard Drumont‟s pamphlet La France Juive. According to Bloy,
Drumont—who was the first prominent French peddler of anti-Semitism during the
Dreyfus Affair191—realized “with the composure of a wily intelligence that…worldly success
consists in feeding human bellies exactly the mast on which they dote,” and so he “dug up
the explosive and persistent claim that [the Jews] have enriched themselves by petty cheating
at our expense.”192
Bloy takes for his title and for his text a line from the fourth chapter of John‟s
Gospel: “Salvation is of the Jews”—“a most disquieting text,” he writes, “which sets us at a
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furious distance from M. Drumont!”193 He also attacks the anti-Dreyfusism and antiSemitism of the Assumptionists, inquiring ironically “whether there might not be some grave
danger in a priestly heart‟s thus begging for the extermination of a people…from which have
sprung the Patriarchs, the Prophets, the Evangelists, the Apostles, the faithful Friends and all
the first Martyrs; without daring to mention the Virgin Mother and Our Savior
Himself…who surely had spent a whole previous eternity coveting that lineage.”194 Bloy
believes that “in days gone by, the Jews were hated, they were gladly massacred, but they
were not held in contempt by virtue of their race…. Anti-Semitism, a wholly modern thing,
is the most horrible blow yet suffered by Our Lord.”195 He concludes with this striking
summation of the implications of Christian doctrine: “remember that every morning I eat a
Jew named Jesus Christ, that I spend a part of my life at the feet of a Jewess… and finally,
that I have put my confidence in a pack of kikes—as you call them.”196
Yet for all this, Richard D. E. Burton has, not without reason, called Le Salut par les
Juifs “one of the most repulsively antisemitic works of a decade that outdid all others in the
violence of its Judaeophobia.”197 For Bloy, all these optimistic, doctrinal affirmations about
the Jewish people are in spite of their crimes. It is simply their destiny to continue in
opposition to Christianity, to play their inevitable role both as persecutors and as persecuted
of the Church. Jews, though ultimately serving a beneficial purpose in light of Christian
teaching, must resist God‟s plans and be beaten by them: “The history of the Jews obstructs
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the history of mankind as a dam obstructs a river, in order to raise its level.”198 Hence,
despite their very real culpability, they cannot be destroyed, and it is useless to try. Bloy
compares them to Cain, the first murderer, who the Lord mercifully “set a Mark upon…that
whosoever found him should not kill him.”199 Moreover, the Jews represent for Bloy the
manifestation of an inevitable historical and spiritual law—that of “the mystical Competition
between the Elder and Younger son.”200 Bloy explains, “The anathematized, the persecuting
brothers always represent the People of God against the Word of God.”201 There is reason to
believe in an ultimate reconciliation of the rebellious elder brother, and Christ will not come
to save all men until this reconciliation. As Burton observes, then, Christians are doubly
indebted to the opposition of Jews—to the extent that they are responsible for the initial,
atoning sacrifice that was the crucifixion, and also in that the result of their present strivings
against Christ will be his final return.202 Bloy makes this Christian Hegelianism explicit: “The
Jews will be converted only when Jesus descends from His Cross, and precisely Jesus will be able
to descend from it only when the Jews are converted [italics mine].”203 Even in his Christian
rehabilitation of Jews, then, Bloy retains an ancient rationale for anti-Semitism: antagonism
to Jews is a necessary component of their eventual reconciliation and of the triumph of
Christianity.
This paradoxical and pragmatic logic of anti-Semitism, making antagonism necessary
for unity, did not disappear with the advent of the more sinister, racial strain to which Bloy
referred. Religious discrimination aside, opposition to Jews was a primary unifying factor for
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the Right as a mass movement in France. According to Zeev Sternhell, racial anti-Semitism
first “made its appearance on the political scene with Boulangism”; “the first national
socialists” valued anti-Semitism not so much for purely ideological reasons, but for its
“revolutionary power and its capacity to mobilize the masses.”204 Maurice Barrès “considered
anti-Semitism the „popular formula‟ par excellence” because of the unanimity and
“revolutionary energy” it could muster.205 And Charles Maurras could hardly have made his
pragmatism more explicit. Calling anti-Semitism‟s emergence “providential,” Maurras exulted
that “it enables everything to be arranged, smoothed over, and simplified. If one were not an
anti-Semite through patriotism, one would become one through a simple sense of
opportunity.”206
National revolution, therefore, was aided by and indebted to the necessary exclusion
of Jews, just as was Christian salvation. Sternhell‟s concluding remarks underscore just how
similar the oppositional logic of modern anti-Semitism was to the old religious kind, as well
as to that of Péguy‟s more general racism. “Unable to define itself in any other way than in
terms of opposition, the nationalism of the turn of the century used racism and antiSemitism as a means of stigmatizing everything it was against. The Jew symbolized the antination: he was all that was negative—the cosmopolitan in opposition to whom, and yet at the same
time in consequence of whom, national sentiment could finally emerge [italics mine].”207 Péguy,
despite his famous pro-Dreyfusard fury, employed an exclusionary, paradoxical logic of the
nation analogous to that of the nationalist anti-Semites. For Péguy, of course, Jews did not
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play the role of “anti-nation,” but rather whoever he assigned to the category, whether it be
the English in Joan‟s day, or the Germans in his own—all those that did not suffer and hope
and fight for God the way the French did.
In view of Péguy‟s nationalism and his exclusion of cultures that are “anti-French,”
the social potential of his monism is tainted. No longer a rationale for social progress, the
beautiful physicality of The Portal—the conviction that “It depends on us Christians / To
make it so that the eternal lacks nothing of the temporal… That the spirit lacks nothing of
the flesh”208—takes on a more ominous cast. The French must incarnate spiritual truth in
the material of the battlefield. As early as 1909, he expressed his monistic nationalism with
predictable derision for intellectuals: “Our positivists will learn metaphysics by the firing of
rifles. And that mutually, for I mean firing and being fired at…. They will learn the relation
between a people‟s body and a people‟s spirit…. Our antipatriots will learn the price of a
carnal fatherland.”209 Moreover, in 1913‟s L’argent (suite), he spoke approvingly of “the
necessity of Rome in the temporal purpose of God”—“Rome,” in the context, clearly
denoting not just the political system but militarism proper.210 Thus, the mystical fusion of
body and spirit that enabled his universalism to manifest itself in social optimism also made
certain that his more pessimistic, exclusivist pronouncements could not be mitigated by the
kind of otherworldly detachment that accompanied the similar misanthropy of the
Protestant tradition.
I have argued that, by drawing on the Christian doctrine of the incarnation, with its
monistic and communal implications, Péguy‟s pretensions to socialist universalism had even
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greater possibility of consistency and success than Lacaze-Duthiers‟ did. His incarnational
monism also unwittingly provided a foundation for the Catholic modernism and social
engagement of the interwar years. But the necessary opposition—the Manichaeism—of his
cultural nationalism, much like Lacaze-Duthiers‟ aesthetic Manichaeism, derailed the
humanistic possibilities of his orthodoxy. God depends on “the fatherland,” even more than
he does on individual bodies, to give material form to spiritual truths, and this in inevitable
opposition to other, less Catholic nations.211 Hence, Péguy can proclaim, “in war times
nothing remains but the State…. And he who surrenders is my enemy, no matter who he is”;
but “Blessed are those who died for carnal cities. / For they are the body of the city of
God.”212
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“BROAD CHURCH MYSTICISM” AND THE SOCIALIST UTOPIA OF
EDWARD CARPENTER
Writing in 1920, after the Romantic and religious phases of socialism in England had
in large part faded into the pragmatic organization and electoral politics of the Labour Party,
Edward Carpenter still conceived of his inevitable socialist millennium, quite impractically, as
“the salvation, for which humanity looks…the return of the little individual self to harmony
and union with the great Self of the universe.”213 That socialism played the role of a
surrogate religion for many 19th-century reformers is almost intuitively evident, and is an
irony often cited without apparent need for proof. In 1977, Stephen Yeo set out to isolate
the specific terms and thought patterns early British socialism borrowed from Christianity,
and to locate the sociological and psychological needs socialism met that religion had earlier
fulfilled. According to Yeo, the religious aspects of early British socialism include its
determinism and millennialism, its desire to resolve “the problem of theodicy,” its call for
absolute devotion, and its asceticism.214 Further, like other young religions still at the
missionary stage, there was little centralization, and much room for diversity.
Carpenter—whose own unique brand of socialism Yeo described as a blend of
“mystical, nature-based, eclectic appropriations of Christian and other religions”215—is, by
virtue of his independence, but also by virtue of the ethical impulse he held in common with
many other early socialists, an exemplar of this idealistic, religious stage. According to
Stanley Pierson, Carpenter “encouraged Socialists to attach Christian sentiment and imagery”
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to their struggle, and “to view the cause in ethical terms rather than the class war” of
Marx.216 Carpenter, born in 1844 to a Brighton magistrate and a conventionally religious
mother, was a pioneer of many causes—from his crusade against the hypocrisy and
unhealthiness of Victorian sexual repression, to his advocacy of acceptance for the
“intermediate sex” of homosexuality, to vegetarianism, anti-vivisectionism, and his lifelong
interest in Hinduism and Eastern philosophy. These aspects of his thought, and especially
those pertaining to sexual liberation, were so dominant that more than one commentator has
suggested that his Romantic and religious brand of socialism was merely a convenient
vehicle for the cultural campaigns he would have wanted to wage regardless.217 The elevation
of the body and the intertwining of matter and spirit, which pervades his heavily Whitmaninspired writings, were actually, according to Sheila Rowbotham, aspects of his attempt to
sanctify “sexual pleasure for its own sake,” thus insulating homosexuality from
condemnation on the grounds that it is not procreative.218 And for Ruth Livesey, Carpenter‟s
asceticism, his emphasis on cleanliness and natural living, and his exaltation of male
comradeship were all motivated by a desire to reconstruct Victorian notions of “bourgeois
masculinity” and to affirm the masculinity of his own homoerotic brand of socialism.219
Though most of these commentators acknowledge in passing the influence that
Carpenter‟s moderately Anglican upbringing and time as a cleric had on his thought and
mission, none have given that influence the consideration it is due, nor have focused on
those aspects of his system that rely on Christian (though often heterodox) particulars. Of
Stanley Pierson, “Edward Carpenter, Prophet of a Socialist Millennium,” Victorian Studies, Vol. 13,
No. 3, (March, 1970), 312.
217 Ibid., 316.
218 Sheila Rowbotham, Edward Carpenter: A Life of Liberty and Love, (London: Verso, 2008), 281.
219 Ruth Livesey, Socialism, Sex, and the Culture of Aestheticism in Britain, 1880-1914, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2007), 117-119.
216

61

the Carpenter family‟s relationship to the popular Brighton preacher Frederick W.
Robertson, Pierson only remarks that Robertson was “noted for his incarnation-centered
theology” and was “a frequent visitor in the Carpenter home.”220 In addition, concerning
Carpenter‟s time as a curate under the vicarage of Frederick D. Maurice—a Broad Church
Anglican and socialist known for his rejection of the doctrine of everlasting punishment—
Pierson rightly observes that “something of the Anglican leader‟s love-centered religious
vision may be found in Carpenter‟s later outlook,” but then leaves it at that.221 Rowbotham,
whose recent biography of Carpenter is nearly exhaustive, echoes Pierson‟s observation, and
likewise leaves the particulars unexplored: “Carpenter…absorbed Maurice‟s approach much
more than he admits.”222 Rowbotham later observes that the Cambridge University
Extension project, for which Carpenter lectured after resigning his curacy, was “suffused” by
its founder “with Maurice‟s vision of social harmony through personal contact,” but
thereafter she only mentions Maurice in passing.223
One reason for this neglect, which Rowbotham and Pierson make apparent in the
above citations, is that Carpenter himself did not elaborate on the influence of Robertson,
Maurice, and the culture of liberal Anglicanism that suffused his earliest years. Pierson
follows Carpenter‟s autobiography almost exactly in his reference to Robertson, for
Carpenter only mentions the preacher once.224 In reference to Maurice, with the exception of
a few illuminating remarks, Carpenter for the most part merely describes the hilarious
difficulty Maurice had in conveying his sincere but obscure moral philosophy into “broken
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sentences,” and highlights the disagreements they had after Carpenter came under his
supervision and knew him personally.225
Instead, concerning the formation of his thought, Carpenter emphasizes his reading
of the Bhagavat Gita, his discovery of H. M. Hyndman‟s England for All, his own ideal of
masculine comradeship and what he called “homogenic love,” and, of course, his early and
abiding love for Whitman. The Bhagavat Gita, “falling into [his] hands” in early 1881, gave
Carpenter “a kind of super-consciousness—which passed all that I had experienced before,
and which immediately harmonized all these other feelings, giving to them their place, their
meaning and their outlet.”226 Similarly, England for All helped Carpenter articulate his vaguely
socialist ideas into a program of action. His ideas, which “had been taking a socialist shape
for many years” had lacked a “definite outline” which Hyndman‟s retelling of Marx‟s theory
of surplus value, especially, then provided—“From that time forward I worked definitely
along the Socialist line: with a drift, as was natural, towards Anarchism.”227 And as for
Whitman, Carpenter famously compared his influence to that “of the sun or the winds.
These influences lie too far back and ramify too complexly to be traced…. „Leaves of Grass‟
„filtered and fibred‟ my blood.”228
Certainly, it is fitting that Carpenter stresses these various determinants, as they were
integral to his system and his mission; his thought relies even more, though, on the
Universalist, Romantic and neo-Platonist breed of Christianity that so pervaded the 19th
century climate of opinion. The religious ideas of German Romantic philosophy, of Samuel
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Taylor Coleridge (in particular among the English Romantics), and of Broad Church
Anglicanism “filtered and fibred” Carpenter‟s blood even more than did Whitman‟s poetry,
and perhaps for that reason were, for him, even less susceptible to being “traced.”
As previously stated, although Carpenter did not elaborate on the seeds of his
thought that are Christian and Romantic, he did make a number of statements that together
form an image of the religious and philosophical influences of his young life, and several of
these concern Maurice specifically. Carpenter remembered that when he was fourteen,
because he observed a young Brighton curate being praised for his manners and sermons, he
began intending to take Orders. He also recalled fantasizing that, in the event of a fire, he
would bravely rescue his prayer book. He dismisses this youthful religiosity with mocking
tone: “I saw myself in my mind‟s eye rushing into my mother‟s room where the sacred
volume lay, and bearing it out through flames and smoke into the street. It was not my
mother or sisters that I was going to save…. Alas! what a defect of nature, or of teaching,
must have been there.” The most memorable characteristic of Carpenter‟s father, Charles,
was his interest in German philosophy. Carpenter jokes that when his father, at the age of 23
and in the navy, began learning German in order to read philosophy in his spare time, it “did
not look as though he were destined to remain long on board ship!”229 Later, Carpenter
explicates more fully what he considered to be his father‟s metaphysical outlook. The lines
are worth quoting and examining at length:
Though having a strong religious feeling, he soon emancipated himself from
current orthodoxies in religion, and seldom in later life went to church….
For Frederick W. Robertson, who was then preaching at Brighton, and who
not unfrequently came to our house, and for Frederick D. Maurice, however,
229
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he had great admiration; and his own views were—as far as I remember what
he said when I was a boy—a kind of Broad Church mysticism, derived at
first from reading S. T. Coleridge (whom he had occasionally met in former
years in London), and gradually broadening out under the influence of
Eckhardt, Tauler, Kant, Fichte, Hegel and others into a religious and
philosophic mysticism without much admixture of the Broad Church at all.230
Robertson was a prominent liberal theologian and follower of Wordsworth,
Coleridge, Carlyle and Goethe, and his sermons at Brighton in the late 1840s and early 50s
were famous for their sensitivity and openness, their emphasis on the goodness and love of
God, and for the number of thoughtful seekers who attended. Maurice, too, was a leader in
the Broad Church movement, a Universalist with regards to Christian salvation, a founder of
Christian Socialism in England, and like Robertson, an admirer of the Romantic poets, and
of Coleridge above all. With the addition of the Germans, this is a revelatory list, and enables
us to locate the intellectual climate of Carpenter‟s youth. His calculated distancing of himself
from his father‟s friends and views (“as far as I remember what he said”) is a bit
disingenuous, as he would later both admit and demonstrate a closer affinity to Robertson,
Maurice, Coleridge and the rest. And his claim that there was very little of the Broad Church
in his father‟s later, more purely philosophic mysticism (with the implied distinction between
the mysticism of the Broad Church and that of the English and German Romantics) is, we
shall see, misguided, since liberal Anglicanism was heavily populated by Romantic
heterodoxies of all kinds. In summing up the influence of his father‟s outlook, though,
Carpenter does recount two other significant ideas he later found in his father‟s
correspondence—in one letter the elder Carpenter discusses the prospect of an eventual
kind of supra-conscious intelligence in man, which will not require reflection, much like the
230
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unconscious instinct in animals; in another letter, he defines Nirvana as the state of being
“so conscious of the indwelling and inworking of Deity, that [man] will ascribe every
movement, whether of his body or mind, to…the One Life, and thus think of himself as
swallowed up by and absorbed, as it were, in that Being.”231 Surveying these statements in
retrospect, Carpenter acknowledges “a priceless debt…to the early contact with [his father‟s]
mind.”232
In the account of his ordination and curacy at Cambridge, and of his personal
contact with Maurice, Carpenter reveals even more about his early theological views. He
emphasizes that, “brought up in the philosophical Broad Churchism of my father,” he did
not even consider that his own mystical idiosyncrasies might be an obstacle to religious
orders. Thus, he recorded that he was surprised, more than anything, when the examining
Bishop—the moderate Harold Browne—singled out his interpretation of Abraham‟s
attempted sacrifice of Isaac for special review.233 Carpenter told the Bishop that the episode
represented the evolution of the human race‟s collective conscience away from human
sacrifice, and toward a higher form of religious observance. The Bishop objected that the
scene was a prefiguring of the Atonement, signifying the necessity of sacrifice but also the
merciful substitution of Christ—the ram caught in the thicket. According to Carpenter, in
another tantalizing allusion, he had “picked up” his explanation of the passage from his
readings of the German historian and religious scholar, Baron von Bunsen, and found the
version confirmed by the histories of England‟s most prominent liberal theologian, Dean
Stanley. Despite disclosing such a level of study on the matter, Carpenter recounted his
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exchange with the bishop with his usual persona of detached ease and humored innocence.
He submitted “so dreadful a heresy…without a qualm,” he writes, and when questioned
about it, “I had some difficulty in understanding what the trouble was, but when the Bishop
in grave tones began to remind me…that the whole scheme of Biblical salvation rested foursquare upon this incident (not forgetting the ram), I immediately saw that the fat was in the
fire, and that there was now no escaping a solemn discussion on the Atonement. And to that
it came.”234 Carpenter prepared a “mystic script” detailing his perspective on the Atonement,
and the Bishop, after reading it replied that he was quite certain Carpenter‟s view “was not
the doctrine of the Church of England.”235 In the event, Carpenter was right to trust in the
broadness of the Anglican Church, as he received ordination minutes later.
The main reason Carpenter had trouble articulating his doctrinal stance at this time,
he claimed, was that his views were “woolly in outline, sadly blurred by the Broad Church
mysticism of F. D. Maurice,”236 again evidencing a perhaps greater familiarity with heterodox
theologies than he cared to clarify. And, finally, in the extended section where he recounts
Maurice‟s coming to Cambridge, and jokes about his esoteric lectures and the great difficulty
his critics had in pinning down his heresies, Carpenter also indicates that, at this time,
Maurice‟s doctrines were still his own. In fact, Carpenter‟s main (and growing) objection to
the life of a churchman was not philosophical or theological, but rather related to the
ignorance and hypocrisy he saw in the average parishioner:
It was curious that after having been brought up in and adopted Maurice‟s
views, I should now, having become his curate, feel as uncomfortable as I
did…. But when it came to standing up oneself in church and reciting these
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documents to a congregation who (as one knew perfectly well) did not
understand a word of them, and practically received them in their grossest
sense and in a spirit of mere superstition, then I felt it was necessary to draw
the line somewhere!.... [T]he trouble to me was a practical one—namely the
insuperable feeling of falsity and dislocation I experienced, and which
accompanied all my professional work from the reading of the services to the
visiting of old women…who would hastily shuffle a Bible or prayer-book on
to the table, when they saw the parson coming.
Finally, in 1909, while speaking at an anniversary of the Vegetarian Society,
Carpenter praised Maurice because “it was one of the great objects of [his] life to bring all
classes together,” and called the churchman “a great influence in my life.”237 From these
several references to his milieu‟s religious mysticism and above all to the Christian
Romanticism of Robertson and Maurice, it is clear that Carpenter owed much to these
inspirations, despite his later, more extended acknowledgements of the impact of Whitman,
Hinduism, Socialism, and his desire for “comradely” love. The debt will become even clearer
after a comparison of the Broad Church Romanticism of the day and of Carpenter‟s system.
In his seminal treatment of Romantic thought and literature, Natural Supernaturalism,
M. H. Abrams traces persistent Christian and Neo-Platonic themes up through the literature
of the 19th and 20th centuries, in order to demonstrate the ways in which Romanticism is,
according to T. E. Hulme, “spilt religion.”238 Among other things, Abrams asserts that
Augustine‟s Confessions is the common ancestor of such disparate innovations as
Wordsworth‟s Prelude and Proust‟s In Search of Lost Time. Augustine‟s inward gaze—and
especially his attempt to retroactively impose order on his life—connect him to these fellow
spiritual autobiographers and give his Confessions the right to be called “the first modern
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work.”239 Of particular significance to Abrams‟ project is the Romantic conceit of the
“circuitous journey,” based on the Christian model of history as a circular, symmetrical, and
providential restoration of fallen man. In the Romantic approximation, the hero, while out
and away from home, confronts a crisis of evil or suffering that brings a new level of selfunderstanding, and, upon his unwitting return home “[knows] the place for the first time.”240
Abrams shows that this (admittedly commonplace) narrative structure for organizing
experience —from primal unity, to self-conscious alienation, and then on to a more perfect
unity—has antecedents in both pagan and Christian thought, but, ultimately, he quips, all
manifestations of this construct are “a long series of footnotes to Plotinus.”241
Plotinus, for Abrams, is the father of all those who recast Adam‟s sin as an
individuation—a consciousness of self—and the imminent salvation as a return to the “All.”
In the Enneads, Plotinus defined the fallen soul as “partial and self-centered,” “a deserter
from the All…isolated, weakened, full of care, intent upon the fragment.”242 Even the sexual
division, according to the medieval Scottish neo-Platonist Erigena, is a product of the fall,
and primordial humanity was androgynous.243 Neo-Platonist, “proto-Hegelian” notions of a
unity that necessarily begets its antithesis, which in turn seeks reconciliation, were energized
by the addition of Hermetic mysteries and “Christianized versions of Kabbalist doctrines,”
and then transmitted into prevalence among radical Christian theologians by Renaissance
thinkers like Giordano Bruno and Jacob Boehme.244 In the 1790s and following, the thought
pattern claimed the widespread currency it enjoys to this day, Abrams argues, because of its
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ability to sort out the great flux and suffering, the “continuous…revolution and disorder”
that characterized Europe after the French Revolution and after the disillusionment with
Enlightenment optimism.245
Coleridge, of all the Romantics, was most concerned with synthesizing Romantic
thought and Christianity, and was instrumental in transmitting neo-Platonic and German
metaphysics to religious thinkers in England. Some aspects of Coleridge‟s Romanticism that
exerted a special pressure on Maurice include his interpretation of the sin of the Fall as
individuality and self-reflection, his narrative of a felix culpa and a universal return of all to
One, his distinction between reason and the understanding, and his belief that all sects and
systems of thought could be reconciled by focusing on their positive statements, rather than
on what they deny.246 As a young man, even before his exposure to German Romanticism,
Coleridge had studied Plotinus, Bruno, Erigena, and Boehme “with great although carefully
qualified admiration.”247 Tellingly, upon his discovery of William Blake, he wrote with
approval that the poet was “a Swedenborgian” and “a mystic emphatically.”248
With all these threads of influence converging, it is no surprise that in his early
Religious Musings, Coleridge describes fallen man collectively as “An Anarchy of Spirits!”; in
this low fragmented state, “the smooth savage roams / Feeling himself, his own low self the
whole.”249 In order to regain the unity of humanity, in all its parts, man must utilize a kind of
supra-rational, intuitive, “sacred sympathy” capable of creating “The whole one Self! .... Self,
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spreading still! Oblivious of its own, / Yet all of all possessing!”250 This, he prophesies, is
“the Messiah‟s destined victory!”251 Accompanying the narrative in Coleridge‟s system is a
distrust of rationality as alienating (“the rational instinct… [formed] the original temptation,
through which man fell”252), and an obsession with locating universal, monistic unity. Like
Plotinus and most 19th century Romantics, though, Coleridge‟s ultimate unity is not as
homogeneous as was the original—the constituent parts have gained by their straying, and
retain their newfound knowledge of individuality, hence the felicity and necessity of the fall.
“Coleridge,” Abrams notes, was “a diversitarian monist,” who believed that humanity‟s end
would be “multiety-in-unity.”253
Maurice would later ascribe his own repudiation of partisanship and his quest for
universal unity, at least in part, to Coleridge‟s instruction, observing, “Those who have
profited most by what he has taught them, do not and cannot form a school.”254 According
to Charles Richard Sanders, Maurice “seized upon” Coleridge‟s conviction that all opposing
sects actually have their most profound, positive pronouncements in common. The more
“we penetrate into the ground of things, the more truth we discover in the doctrines of the
great number of philosophical sects,” writes Coleridge: “All these we shall find united in one
perspective central point.”255 This notion took on a more distinctly Christian cast in Maurice,
and “grew into his vision of the Church Universal.”256 For Maurice, who had met opposition
for his rejection of the exclusivism of the doctrine of hell, the Church “is neither Anglican,

In Ibid.
In Ibid.
252 In Ibid., 268.
253 Ibid, 269.
254 In Sanders, 31.
255 In Ibid., 33.
256 Ibid., 34.
250
251

71

Gallican, nor Roman, neither Latin or Greek.”257 To the Scottish Minister McLeod Campbell
he wrote, “Perhaps I hold more strongly than you do a reconciliation of the whole of
humanity with God in Christ,”258 and, similarly, he spoke reproachfully of any who would
presume to “divert the stream of God‟s mercy into canals and tanks of their own
manufacture.”259
Further, Maurice believed, in accord with neo-Platonism and Romanticism, that
humanity‟s quest for original unity was the primary mechanism and design of history. For
Maurice, the Reformation and the Enlightenment were to blame for the new wave of
individualism and intellectualism, and he saw the 19th century as playing a penultimate role in
history‟s scheme, uniting the positive aspects of the Enlightenment with an older notion of
communion and self-forgetting. Maurice‟s Christian Socialism was motivated by these
spiritual beliefs, and he hoped to see all classes united just as all creeds would be. “I cannot
help thinking that a time is at hand…when we shall perceive that what we call our individual
salvation means nothing, and that our faith in it becomes untenable when we separate it
from the salvation which Christ wrought out for the world.”260 Maurice also believed in a
“multiety-in-unity,” rather than a total obliteration of the individual in the whole. In his
theological terms, he affirmed that man could and ought to know himself and others: “We
can know nothing of ourselves till we look above ourselves…. The knowledge of man is
possible because the knowledge of God is possible.”261 As in Coleridge‟s distinction between
reason and the understanding, and perhaps analogous to Bergson‟s later separation of
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intuition and intellect, Maurice did not deny the possibility of communicating with and
knowing God through God-given reason—the problem came when men attempted to
understand God in purely human terms and constructs, a job for which the understanding is
not intended.262
Perhaps the most important way in which Maurice attempted to reconcile Romantic
thought with orthodox Christianity was by an optimistic appeal to the doctrine of Christ‟s
incarnation, with its implications of the goodness of the physical world, and of Christ‟s
spiritual and physical empathy with all persons. Maurice, according to Paul Dafydd Jones,
held to a “radically immanentist understanding of God”—seeing God‟s governance and
concern for universal love and equality as directly operative in the world—and to a “Christic
anthropology” in which “all human beings [share] in the infinite goodness of Christ, not the
corruptive sin of Adam.”263 Maurice‟s brand of socialism was driven by this assumption of
spiritual equality and brotherhood in Christ, and he hoped that, on this basis, acts of
sympathetic contact between classes would suffice to bring about a more just society.
Maurice explicitly believed that interclass sympathy and open communication was a more
effective long-term tactic than the alteration of conditions.264 Maurice encapsulated the
relationship between his incarnational theology and his social project, in an 1848 essay
entitled “Fraternity”—if it is true that “an Everlasting Father has revealed himself to men in
an elder Brother,” Maurice observed, then “we can feel to each other as brothers; we can
look upon all you whom we address in this paper, nobles, shopkeepers, labourers,
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mechanics, beggars, aristocrats, democrats, people of every class and party, as brothers.” 265
Maurice critiqued the traditional social system from the vantage point of his belief in
universal equality in Christ—for Christians and non-Christians alike. Since all are equal,
competition was immoral and cooperation a mandate.266
Likewise, Robertson—the Brighton minister and regular guest in Carpenter‟s
childhood home—found in the doctrine of the incarnation a common ground between the
progressive and Romantic teleologies of the age and Christian orthodoxy. In one sermon
preached at Brighton parish, he attempted to explain the mysterious implications of Christ‟s
humanity. Carpenter, of course, may not have been in the congregation that day, and, at any
rate, was only a child, but Robertson‟s words further illustrate the intellectual atmosphere
encouraged in Charles Carpenter‟s home. Taking as his text Hebrews 4:15-16, which explains
that Christ “was in all points tempted like as we are,” Robertson argued that Christ‟s ability
to be tempted physically and spiritually, as a man, illustrates “the truth of the human heart of
God.”267 Moreover, the fact that he will continue, eternally, as a man is doubly significant in
its application: “We think of God as a spirit, infinitely removed from and unlike the
creatures He has made. But the truth is, man resembles God…. The mind of God is similar
to the mind of man…. The present manhood of Christ conveys this deeply important truth, that the
Divine heart is human in its sympathies [italics mine].”268 All possibility of goodness and sympathy
between man and man is a product of this sympathy between God and man. Robertson felt
that it would be difficult to overestimate “how much the sum of human happiness in the
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world is indebted to this one feeling—sympathy. We get cheerfulness and vigor…from mere
association with our fellow-men.”269
In a later sermon, preached in Brighton when Carpenter was eight years old, and
entitled “Man‟s Greatness and God‟s Greatness,” Robertson, again synthesizing Romantic
and neo-Platonist ideas with orthodox Christianity, declared that man‟s greatness consists in
his dependence on and his union with God. Echoing Plotinus, Coleridge, and the prophet
Isaiah, he asserted, “to be independent is man‟s shame…. And the moment man cuts
himself off from God, that moment he cuts himself off from all true grandeur.”270
In his own appropriation of the Christian-Romantic teleology of the “circuitous
journey” (with its attendant neo-Platonic universalism), in his desire to maintain a healthy
individualism in the hoped-for collective, in his critique of the limits of scientific knowledge
and his belief in a supra-conscious level of spiritual intuition, in his rejection of Victorian
repressiveness, and elevation of material goods to spiritual ones—in all these ways,
Carpenter showed just how much he, too, was a product of the alliance between
Romanticism and Broad Church mysticism. In fact, the reason Whitman‟s corporeality and
comradeliness, the Bhagavat Gita‟s idealism, and early British socialism‟s desire to bring
classes together all found such fertile ground in Carpenter, is not that he was, simply by
nature, ready to embrace something antithetical to his upbringing; rather, these influences, by
their very resemblance to his intellectual environment, grafted themselves onto an alreadyformed thought system, resonating with earlier inspirations and helping him organize and
articulate those inspirations.
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Carpenter‟s “masterwork” and most famous publication is his long, free-verse poem
“Towards Democracy,” first published in 1883 and expanded in subsequent editions until
complete in 1905. Carpenter composed the work under the heavy and admitted sway of
Whitman‟s Leaves of Grass, and the “Song of Myself” in particular was the “template” for
Carpenter‟s title poem, according to Michael Robertson.271 It is certainly not surprising, then,
that the nebulous social project outlined in “Towards Democracy” is saturated with
declarations of the greatness and transcendence of the physical world and its desires, and of
the need for spiritual and physical communion with others. The speaker is a Whitmanesque
Everyman who easily traverses England‟s social strata and empathizes with every profession,
every gender, and every age. Identification with others is achieved by first identifying with
one‟s own body—unlearning the dualistic austerity of Victorian religiosity. Carpenter defines
the “freed soul” as one “that has completed its relation to the body,” and the millennium as
a time when “men and women all over the earth shall ascend and enter into relation with
their bodies.”272 Note his insistence, with “ascend,” that the body‟s needs and realities are
not lower than spirit, but higher even.
As in the Romantic theologies of Maurice and Robertson, knowledge of one‟s own
individual self is only possible by entering into physical and spiritual union with all—the
knowledge of God so to speak. In what is almost certainly an intentional inversion of the
evocative lines of Psalm 17:15 (“As for me, I will behold thy face in righteousness: I shall be
satisfied, when I awake, with thy likeness” [KJV]), Carpenter encourages the downtrodden
with an image of perfect, millennial knowledge of self and God, individual and collective:
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“When you shall behold yourself in the clean mirror of God you shall be wholly satisfied
[italics mine].”273 In this construction, it is not man‟s duty to reflect God; rather God is a
mirror reflecting the collective spirit of humanity back upon each one. Carpenter continues
to elaborate on the connection between his monism and his ideals of equality and fellowship.
“The body is the root of the soul…. The soul sustains itself in love,” he writes, intending
“love” to signify sex.274 “You shall realise Yourself,” concludes Carpenter, only by
“penetrating into that medium” of Equality with others.275 Carpenter hoped that men who
recognized human equality might have interclass encounters both sexual and spiritual—by
their fellowship and camaraderie paving the way for a more just society.276 This latter
emphasis is, of course, a unique addition to Maurice‟s ideal of human fellowship, but the
tactical model (cross-class associations as the primary mechanism for social change) is
identical.
Carpenter‟s monism, I have argued, was the sole product neither of his desire to
rehabilitate “homogenic” love, nor of Whitman‟s influence. These considerations only
invigorated a belief he had long been exposed to and taken as his own, without needing to
take the specific doctrine literally—that of the social consequences of the incarnation. On
multiple occasions in “Towards Democracy,” Carpenter relies on the biblical phraseology of
the incarnation to describe his narrator‟s project. He admonishes England not to look for
any God, or system, or philosophy to save them; instead, he writes, they should look for
“The Son of Man”—that descriptor for Christ used most often in the Gospels, and
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emphatic of his humanity. The Son of Man “will not bring a new revelation,” will not answer
“eager questions about death and immortality,” will not be perfect; instead, he will bring
“just the whole look of himself in his eyes,” and will “restore the true balance.”277 Again, as
Carpenter‟s Everyman narrator travels from one sympathetic association to another, he says,
“I am a seeing unseen atom… I resume a body and disclose myself.”278 In each of these
incarnational encounters, his desire is to “touch” each person (“Him I touch, and her I
touch, and you I touch—I can never be satisfied”279), much as the First Epistle of John says
that because Christ was manifested in the world, “our hands have handled…the Word of
life.” Further, Carpenter‟s narrator proclaims, “I am come…. Born beyond Maya [that is,
before time] I now descend into materials”; similarly, in the book of Hebrews, the writer
says, “when [Christ] cometh into the world, he saith…a body hast thou prepared me…. Lo,
I come.”280
Carpenter borrows expressions from the prophetic book of Isaiah, a book notable
for its dual emphases on both God‟s immanence and his transcendence. Carpenter‟s narrator
claims to have lived in the physical world at one time, but now he “[has] the freedom of
worlds innumerable”281—Isaiah 57 (the passage, incidentally, on which Robertson had based
his Brighton sermon, “Man‟s Greatness and God‟s Greatness”) relates that God “inhabits
innumerable worlds,” while simultaneously, somehow, dwelling with men. Similarly,
Carpenter borrows the famous paean from Isaiah 6—“Holy! Holy! Holy!”—to praise not the
Christian God, but the transcendent state of being in union with all. Returning to images of
Carpenter, Towards Democracy, 48-49.
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the incarnation, Carpenter, in a line reminiscent of Maurice‟s “Christic anthropology,”
concludes that every child born into the world is, as Christ was, a union of matter and spirit,
a confirmation of equality and fellowship. Every mother‟s body is “a temple of the Holy
One.”282
In his late work of comparative religion, The Origins of Pagan and Christian Beliefs—
which is in the main a demonstration of the commonalities between the historic religions of
the world—Carpenter‟s philosophical monism and belief in a universal, Romantic scheme of
history are especially evident. The central thesis of The Origins is that Christianity “[sprang]
from just the same root as Paganism, and that it shares by far the most part of its doctrines
and rites with the latter.”283 The growth of human religions is one aspect of humanity‟s
inevitable movement towards higher consciousness and fellow-feeling, and the more one
studies the similarities between world religions, from taboos and rites of expiation to
messiah figures and eucharists, the clearer it becomes “that religious evolution through the
ages has been practically One thing—that there has been in fact a World-religion, though
with various phases and branches.”284 Carpenter conducts his exploration of these similarities
in great detail, but all, ultimately, in order to prove that there are three stages in the evolution
of human consciousness—simple, animal consciousness, self-consciousness, and that which
“for want of a better word we may term…Universal Consciousness.”285
As in neo-Platonist and Manichean narratives of inevitable but profitable evil, “it
would be foolish and useless to rail against the process” by which man fell into self-
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consciousness: “It had to be.”286 In Carpenter‟s version, though, it is Christianity—or at least
a bourgeois, individualistic appropriation of Christianity—that is responsible for the middle,
self-conscious stage, and the final stage will combine the positive, brotherhood-affirming
pronouncements of Christ with those of other religions. The affinity of Carpenter‟s narrative
to those of Coleridge and Plotinus could hardly be more pronounced. “Man, centering
round himself, necessarily became an exile from the great Whole. He committed the sin (if it
was a sin) of Separation.”287 And again, in what seems almost an exact borrowing from the
travels of one of Plotinus‟ “emanations” or of the Romantic hero of a Bildungsroman: “To
some such unity-consciousness we have to return; but clearly it will not be…of the simple
inchoate character of the First Stage, for it has been enriched, deepened, and greatly
extended by the experience of the Second Stage.”288 All the elements of Abrams‟ “circuitous
journey” are here—the circular symmetry, the balance of individualism and collectivism in
the final stage (“multiety-in-unity”), the educative necessity of the intermediate wilderness
wanderings, and the inevitability of it all. And for Carpenter, as for Maurice, the 19th century
occupies a special place in the cosmic plan. “In the present day this period is reaching its
culmination,” Carpenter prophesied; “a great and general new birth,” is “now not so very far
off.”289
Further, in Carpenter‟s vague intimations about what the future society would
actually be like, there is more of Robertson and Maurice‟s Romantic, incarnational
Christianity than there is of Hyndman‟s socialism. Carpenter explains that the ancient
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mystery of the Eucharist—that God is himself the eternally recurrent, physical victim of his
own sacrifice—represents the truth that there is a link between God and man (and man and
man), and symbolizes the participation of the individual in the collective, eternal life of
humanity.290 By an intuitive recognition of the unifying power of love and of one‟s
identification with the rest of humanity, one can rise above tribal affiliations and, in a sense,
live forever (here the similarity with Bergson, too, is palpable). As in Maurice‟s Christian
Socialism, the final stage will be democratic not because all will be equal and classes
obliterated, or because of majority rule, or because of a dictatorship of the proletariat, but
because it will rely on “intuitive understanding” of differences, and class distinctions that
remain will not prevent sympathetic contact and fellowship.291 “Emancipated Man,”
Carpenter wrote, “passes…through all grades and planes of human fellowship, equal and
undisturbed, and never leaving his true home and abiding place in the heart of all.”292 The
final stage of Unity echoes Maurice and Robertson‟s ideals, finally, in that the individual‟s
capacity for self-knowledge and individuality will be dependent on his knowledge of and
participation in the Whole.293
In some respects, it would be hard to locate a man more seemingly antithetical to his
age than was Carpenter. His various crusades—vegetarianism, the benefits of sandalwearing, anti-vivisectionism, Hinduism, Transcendentalism, socialism, tolerance and
recognition for same-sex love—made him marginal to Victorian convention. Even his
socialist allies, exceptional themselves, considered Carpenter a rarity: G. B. Shaw, who knew
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him personally from meetings of the Fellowship of the New Life and the Fabian Society,
mockingly dubbed him “The Noble Savage,” and Hyndman complained that “odd cranks”
and “sentimentalists” like Carpenter were confusing and misdirecting socialist energies.294
But despite his innovations and idiosyncrasies, Carpenter‟s entire philosophy rested on the
well-worn tenets of Romanticism, and particularly on the Broad Church mystic variety
familiar to many educated Englishmen. Christianity and neo-Platonist universalism are of
such significance to Carpenter‟s worldview that, among his contemporaries, it seems to me
that he most resembles not one of his socialist comrades, for instance, or one of England‟s
other upper-class advocates of “homogenic love,” such as J. A. Symonds, but rather the
Scottish minister, mystic, poet, and fantasy-writer George MacDonald.
MacDonald, who is the rightful but neglected father of adult, prose fantasy in the
English language, was, like Carpenter, a follower and associate of Maurice, and he was even
persuaded by Maurice‟s Broad Churchism to join the Anglican Church for a time, despite his
disagreement with many of the Thirty-nine Articles.295 Further, MacDonald read
Swedenborg, Boehme, and Blake extensively, and his own fantastic novels were consciously
modeled on the work of German Romantic mystics such as Novalis.296 MacDonald was
“heretically eccentric”—not only did he align himself with the “liberal” wing of the church
in matters of biblical criticism and interpretation, but he was an extreme universalist in all its
implications. His constitution rebelled against the strict Calvinism of his homeland. He
believed that all would be saved, that non-Christians would have opportunities in the
afterlife to come to know the Christian God, and he even suggested that the devil would
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ultimately be redeemed.297 Much like Carpenter, MacDonald resolved (to his own
satisfaction) the problem of evil and suffering, both in the temporal, material world and in
the cosmic scheme of salvation, by recourse to a neo-Platonist universalism. Because man,
unlike God, is limited in time, according to MacDonald, God‟s good designs on him must
take place in time, with all the process of suffering that entails.298 Suffering in this world, and
suffering in whatever form hell might take in the afterlife, are temporary means of
instruction and growth. “Evil,” wrote MacDonald, “is a moral good—a mighty means to a
lofty end.”299 Again, even hell is not retributive, but restorative: “I believe that no hell will be
lacking which would help the just mercy of God redeem his children.”300
MacDonald‟s most famous and influential adult fantasy, Phantastes, is about a young
man named “Anodos”—a Greek word meaning “a way back”—whose travels in Fairy Land
signify his desire to return, to find “a way back” to the innocence of childhood.301 Anodos‟
narrative is largely episodic, proceeding from event to interchangeable event, but is, in part,
organized around his acquisition of a shadow, and his eventual eradication of that shadow
through good deeds. He comes upon a hut in a clearing, in which an old woman is reading
aloud: “As darkness had no beginning, neither will it ever have an end. So, then, it is
eternal.”302 In the hut, he is possessed of an “irresistible desire” to look in the closet, and,
when he does, he meets and is bound to his shadow. Later on, he meets a “little maiden,”
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“almost a woman,” who “carried a small globe, bright and clear as the purest crystal.”303 The
globe has vibratory, musical qualities, but Anodos touches it too roughly, his shadow
envelops it, and it shatters. According to Richard Reis, the touch and the breaking of the
crystal sphere is suggestive of the loss of sexual innocence.304
At any rate, the shadow and the shattered glass both represent the prehistoric
disobedience and loss of unity, the necessary evil within the neo-Platonic narrative. At the
end of the story, by opening another door, Anodos unwittingly frees the young maiden,
whom he has not seen for some time, from confinement. At first he does not recognize her,
but she reminds him, “You broke my globe. Yet I thank you.”305 If she had not been
deprived of the instrument, she would not have learned “something so much better. I do not
need the globe…for I can sing.”306 Anodos sees that the maiden had been “uplifted, by
sorrow and well-doing, into a region I could hardly hope ever to enter.” But as the maiden
departs, she sings this universalist, monist encouragement: “Thou goest thine, and I go
mine— / Many ways we wend; / Many days, and many ways, / Ending in one end. / Many
a wrong, and its curing song… but only one home / For all the world to win.”307 Here, as
elsewhere, the similarity to Coleridge, Maurice, and Carpenter‟s narratives of future, mystical
union, and to their belief in the compatibility of positive truth claims, is obvious. With
confidence in the design of the universe, and in the beneficial and necessary effects of evil,
Anodos claims, “I know that good is coming to me—that good is always coming.”308
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I have argued that Carpenter‟s mature philosophy, despite its apparent divergences
from 19th century English Christianity, owed at least as much to these sources as to his later
discoveries. With regard to his famous fascination with Hinduism, I believe this thesis is
especially illuminating. Carpenter‟s debt to “Broad Church mysticism” at once encouraged
and tempered his fascination with Eastern religion, and the ways in which he critically and
selectively utilized the lessons of Hinduism distinguishes him from other fin-de-siècle
admirers of the mystical superiority of the East.
In Britain, the 1890‟s was a time of renewed interest in the spiritual and cultural
offerings of the East, after a century-long hiatus of missionary fervor and a narrow, Anglocentric imperial philosophy.309 The most important example of this interest was the
Theosophical movement, founded in New York in 1875 by the Russian Helena Blavatsky,
who claimed to receive letters that traveled through space from Buddhist mahatmas in the
Himalayas.310 Blavatsky, who knew nothing of India‟s languages, taught that all religions have
common origin in an ancient “wisdom-religion,” that the universe is the product of
“emanations” from a primal One, and that each person possesses a higher self, accessible
through mystic, esoteric rituals.311 Theosophy found fertile ground among devotees of
spiritualism, which had been in vogue since mid-century, but, more significantly, among
those critical of British imperialism and mission work, those weary of 19th-century
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materialism and industrial civilization, and those who sought a spiritual life that did not seem
to conflict with the recent discoveries of science.312
At the invitation of a Singhalese friend from Cambridge named Arunáchalam,
Carpenter traveled to Ceylon in 1890 in order to sit under the teaching of his friend‟s guru,
Gñani Ramaswamy. Like so many other Western enthusiasts of an idealized Hinduism,
Carpenter wrote to a friend that he hoped “to renovate my faith, and unfold the frozen buds
which civilisation & fog have nipped!”313 In accord with his expectations, he found the
Gñani to be a “pre-civilization man”—“one could almost feel him to be one of the old
Vedic race of two thousand or three thousand years back.”314 With the Gñani, he felt himself
“in contact with…the intense consciousness…of the oneness of all life…the soul and impulse
of religion after religion.”315 In January 1891, he observed a nighttime religious festival in
Taypusam, in which “hundreds if men and boys, bare-bodied…but with white loin-cloths”
marched into the temple and, with horns blaring, worshipped the lingam—a stylized phallus
symbolic of Shiva. He was enamored of Hinduism‟s openness and innocence about
sexuality, again like other Western admirers.316
Unlike many Theosophists (whose teachings he characterized as “of a somewhat
second-hand character”) and other eager critics of Western civilization, though, Carpenter
did not betray the monist supposition that all religious and cultural traditions have positive
contributions in common, including that of the West. In fact, despite finding in Hindu
mysticism the spiritual component of love and unity that he had sought, Carpenter was often
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critical of Indian society, even to the point of prescribing Western remedies. When he first
arrived in Ceylon, he noted—ironically, with an air of snobbery in the service of democratic
ideals—that “the natives are…too submissive creatures…there is something very touching
about them.”317 Carpenter appreciated the Hindu emphasis on internal contemplation as the
path to a spiritual kind of casteless unity, but “in the west, he countered, “ we are in the
habit of looking on devotion to other humans…as the most natural way of losing one‟s selflimitations and passing into a larger sphere of life and consciousness.”318 For Carpenter, as
for the Romantic Christian Socialists, the future state of universal, unitary consciousness had
to be accompanied by material, social equality, and a continuing sense of individuality.
Carpenter hoped that “a dash of the Western materialism” would help the lower castes to
assert themselves,319 that more freedom would be given to women, and that science would
“give that definition and materialism...which is so badly wanting in the India of to-day.”320
Remembering his “personal experiences of the Eastern teachings” ten years later, he
mused that “the true line is that...which consists in combining and harmonizing both body
and soul.” East and West had historically erred on opposite sides of this dualism. “The
Indian methods” could bring “great illumination,” but also “over-quiescence” and “torpor”;
“Western habits” tend to the “over-activity and...distraction of the mind,” ending in
“disintegration.”321 Carpenter credited Whitman for “first adequately [pointing] out” the
necessity of balancing these two poles. Of course, as we have seen, his familiarity with this
idea began much earlier than in his discovery of Leaves of Grass.
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While Carpenter‟s hopes for social and spiritual union, like those of Maurice and
MacDonald, could certainly be criticized as naïve and optimistic, his is no Panglossian “best
of all possible worlds.” He recognized the suffering and opposition in this world, but he
believed that these things carried within them the seeds of redemption. On the other hand,
he is rare among Romantic thinkers for not emphasizing opposition more. The neo-Platonist
and incarnational impulses of his thought prevented his project from halting at a kind of
Romantic, heroic or nationalistic Manichaeism, as did Lacaze-Duthiers and Péguy‟s
pretensions at universalism.
In the context of 19th-century preoccupations with the problem of evil (and social
inclusion vs. social opposition), Carpenter‟s philosophy is “neo-Platonist” as opposed to
“Manichean,” in the sense that, although both heterodoxies teach the instructional and
evolutionary necessity of evil (the felix culpa), Manichaeism makes evil (or antagonism to the
Romantic hero) eternal, while neo-Platonism prophesies the return of every deed and every
person to perfect Oneness. Like many religious and social thinkers of his day, Carpenter
employed a Romantic narrative that relied on inevitable antithesis and reconciliation. But
perhaps by temperament, and perhaps because of the particular brand of Romanticism
transmitted to him through the Broad Church, Carpenter‟s writings avoid any sign of the
pessimistic, spurned martyr (or nation of martyrs) that so often eclipsed Romanticism‟s
social possibilities. Moreover, empowered by the sincere monism of Coleridge‟s
Romanticism and of a certain form of Christological orthodoxy, Carpenter was better
situated than were Péguy and Massis, for instance, to judge the many benefits and
disadvantages of different cultures, whether “East” or “West.”
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CONCLUSION
Three case studies is certainly too small a pool to make any conclusive
generalizations about the differences between French and British social thought, or about
the comparative merits of “Manichean” and “neo-Platonist” redemption narratives—but I
will make a few suggestions. According to Paul M. Cohen, who in this respect relies on
Pierre Bourdieu‟s notion of the “consecrated heretic,” there has been, since the days of
Rousseau, a “peculiarly French concept” of intellectual and artistic freedom, involving the
necessity that the intellectual hero be isolated, within the establishment he criticizes but
marginal to it.322 This concept, as we have seen, must ironically be accompanied by the
intellectual‟s inability to successfully persuade others, otherwise he loses his marginal
position. Here is the metaphorical “Manichaeism”: confidence that one has exclusive truth,
but pessimism regarding other people‟s ability to receive that truth.
That this kind of intellectual martyr‟s complex has historically enjoyed greater vogue
in France than elsewhere, while certainly a thesis with evident merit, would be very difficult
to demonstrate. It is certain, though, that it is not a distinctly French phenomenon. It seems
that both of these competing beliefs—on one side, unifying truths can be found in
competing beliefs, and progress is therefore possible; on the other, opposition validates the
truth by defining it, and division and skepticism, therefore, are necessary—are a profound
part of the human experience, and can be found coexisting even in single individuals.
I have tried to demonstrate that, in the face of the economic, cultural, social and
intellectual confusions of modern life, Lacaze-Duthiers, Péguy, Carpenter and their fellows
Paul M. Cohen, Freedom’s Moment: An Essay on the French Idea of Liberty from Rousseau to
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turned to older Christian and mystical modes of thought, in order to organize, justify, and
mitigate the experience of suffering, inequality, and opposition—with mixed results. Of
course, the taxonomical shorthand I have employed—“Manichaean” vs. “neo-Platonist”—
is, like all generalizations, susceptible to the criticism that it obscures significant differences,
thus becoming a meaningless term. Just as there are as many “fascisms” as there are fascists,
there are as many “Manichaeisms” as there are Manicheans, and I have tried to be sensitive
to the many distinctions between Lacaze-Duthiers and Péguy. In general, moreover, it is by
no means certain that “neo-Platonist” universalism and optimism is always superior to a
more pessimistic, opposition-oriented outlook. Perhaps, as Kolakowski suggests, societies
need both pessimists and optimists, with regard to humanity‟s potential for understanding
and harmony, in order to function properly. At any rate, it is important, as we decide what
kind of people we want to be, what kind of policies we want to support, and what kind of
society we want to inhabit, to consider the religious and Romantic antecedents of our
presuppositions.
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